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Pacta sunt servanda, the cardinal rule of international law, prohibits the
breaking of agreements. But what role should international law play in the
making of agreements? In How Nations Behave, Louis Henkin challenges
lawyers "to think beyond the substantive rules of law to the function of law, to
the nature of its influence, the opportunities it offers, the limitations it
imposes-as well as to understand the limits of its influence in a society of
sovereign nations.' 2 In that spirit, international law scholars have redoubled
efforts during the last decade to measure the influence of law on international
politics, drawing on theoretical and methodological frameworks developed by
political scientists. 3 Relatively little attention, however, has been directed to
explaining how law functions in international peace negotiations, in part,
perhaps, because it is difficult to find satisfying answers to this question
within the framework of a single discipline. While contract and negotiation
theorists have examined how parties make use of, and are constrained by,
legal rules when engaged in private ordering, their analysis has tended not to
address the peculiarities of the international setting-in particular, the relative
indeterminacy of international legal norms and the relative unavailability of
recourse to third-party adjudication and enforcement. Conversely, because
studies by international law and international relations scholars have tended to
focus on compliance with multilateral treaty regimes and adjudications by
international tribunals, they overlook the unique roles that law plays in the
context of international bargaining.
1. Muhammad al-As'ad, The Earth Also Dies, in ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN PALESTINIAN
LITERATURE 123 (Salma Khadra Jayyusi ed., May Jayyusi & Jack Collom trans., 1992).
2. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 4-5 (2d ed. 1979).
3. For a survey of recent work in this area, see MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?
International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107 (1998); Oona A. Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 367 (1998).
4. A notable exception is Joaquin Tacsan's study of the Central American peace process in
the 1980s. See generally JOAQUIN TACSAN, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (1992).
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The nature of these roles is of more than academic concern. When
Palestinian and Israeli officials undertook from late 1999 to early 2001 to
negotiate a "permanent status" 5 agreement in an effort to bring their century-
long conflict to an end, they expressed sharply differing views not only about
their respective rights and obligations under international law, but also, more
fundamentally, about the relevance of international legal norms to the bilateral
negotiation process in which they were engaged. Although their failure,
ultimately, to conclude a peace agreement is undoubtedly attributable to a
variety of factors, I submit that their differences regarding the role of
international law in the peace talks form an important, and as yet
insufficiently documented, part of the picture. Understanding the nature and
consequences of those differences is valuable for the contribution it offers not
only to research on the influence of law on international politics, but also,
more importantly, to efforts to ensure that when Palestinians and Israelis
eventually return to the negotiating table they have more success.
To be sure, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and peace process are the
focus of a voluminous body of academic literature. Political accounts of the
peace talks have proliferated since the suspension of negotiations in January
2001. In addition, legal scholars and advocates have explored in some depth
both the substantive legal issues implicated by the underlying conflict and an
array of process questions presented by the talks. 7 What continues to be
5. In 1993 Palestinians and Israelis agreed to establish interim self-government arrangements
for the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to commence "negotiations on the
permanent status" of the Palestinian territories following a transitional period of five years. Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization, art. I (Sept. 13, 1993), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE
PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS 890, 890 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2005)
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT].
6. See, e.g., SHLOMO BEN-AMI, SCARS OF WAR, WOUNDS OF PEACE: THE ISRAELI-ARAB
TRAGEDY (2005); CHARLES ENDERLIN, SHATTERED DREAMS: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, 1995-2002 (Susan Fairfield trans., Other Press 2003); WILLIAM B. QUANDT, PEACE
PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 (rev. ed. 2001); DENNIS
Ross, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE (2004); CLAYTON
E. SWISHER, THE TRUTH ABOUT CAMP DAVID: THE UNTOLD STORY ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (2004); Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of
Errors, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at 59.
7. Recent contributions to this literature include: JOHN QUIGLEY, THE CASE FOR PALESTINE:
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2005); GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000); Susan M. Akram &
Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for
Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); Roy Balleste, The International Status of Jerusalem:
The Legacy of Lasting Peace, 43 REV. DER. P.R. 249 (2004); Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice:
The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 934 (2003); Dr. Fadia Daibes,
A Progressive Multidisciplinary Approach for Resolving the Palestinian-Israel Conflict Over the Shared
Transboundary Groundwater: What Lessons Learned From International Law?, 8 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 93 (2004); Allison Beth Hodgkins, Beyond Two-States: Alternative Visions of Self-Determination
for the People of Palestine, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 109 (2004); Ardi lmseis, On the Fourth
Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65 (2003); Orde F.
Kittrie, More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1661 (2003) (reviewing THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND THE LESSONS OF
FAILURE-PERSPECTIVES, PREDICAMENTS, AND PROSPECTS (Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma'oz & Khalil
Shikaki eds. 2002) and MICHAEL WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION: HOW GREAT NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD WAR
CONFLICTS (2001)); Russell Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road Map: A Negotiation
Theory Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict After Yasser Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2005);
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missing from the discussion, however, is both a theoretical framework for
explaining the functions of law in international peace negotiations and a
detailed retrospective analysis of the functions international law actually
served-and failed to serve-in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.
8
This Article is intended to help fill both of these gaps. Part II of the
Article introduces a theoretical framework for analyzing the functions of law
in international bargaining. I begin by revisiting the critical insight, offered by
Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser in their influential 1979 article, that
parties bargain "in the shadow of the law." 9 As they explain, "the outcome
that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives each [party] certain
bargaining chips" in negotiations, even if the parties choose to order their
relations in a manner that departs from the outcome that law would otherwise
prescribe. 10 Drawing on more recent scholarship by contract and negotiation
theorists, I examine how legal rules function to promote efficiency and
fairness by narrowing the scope of bargaining, framing trade-offs, providing
objective standards for evaluating competing claims, and filling in gaps in an
agreement.
I then turn to exploring how these functions translate to the international
setting. As I describe, "the shadow of the law"-the influence law exerts on
bargaining as a result of the possible imposition of a legal remedy if
negotiations fail-is diminished at the international level, where norms are
often under-developed and the adjudication and enforcement of legal rights
tends to be a remote prospect at best. I argue, however, that the "shadow"
metaphor fails to capture an important function of law in international
bargaining. As a growing body of international law and international relations
literature suggests, the influence of legal rules does not turn solely on the
Randolph "Michael" Nacol II, Negotiating on Un-Holy Land: The Road from Israel to Palestine, 4 PEPP.
DisP. RESOL. L.J. 87 (2003); Jonathan W. Reitman, Ten Principles to Aid the Quest for Peace in the
Middle East, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb./Apr. 2002, at 50; Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a
Right of Return to Israel? An Examination of the Scope of and Limitations on the Right of Return, 44
VA. J. INT'L L. 829 (2004).
8. There is no lack of interest in the topic. In 1999, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law convened a discontinuous symposium entitled "The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity
in the Middle East," contributions to which were subsequently published by the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law. See, e.g., John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli
Accommodation, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351 (1999); Shimon Shetreet, Negotiations and
Agreements Are Better Than Legal Resolutions: A Response to Professor John Quigley, 32 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 259 (2000). Because the symposium took place prior to the resumption of permanent
status negotiations in September 1999, however, the participants were unable to offer analysis of the
negotiations themselves. More recently, the role of the law in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
was the topic of a symposium sponsored by the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research,
contributions to which were published by the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review. See
George E. Bisharat, Facts, Rights, and Remedies: Implementing International Law in the
Israel/Palestine Conflict, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319 (2005). This was also the topic of a
panel during the 2005 annual conference of the American Society of International Law. See Georges
Abi Saab, Remarks, Is There a Role for International Law in the Middle East Peace Process?, in 99 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 215 (2005). Although participants in both events offered important insights, they
did not undertake either to define a theoretical framework for analyzing how law functions in
international bargaining processes or to examine in detail how it functioned in Palestinian-Israeli peace
talks.
9. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
10. Id. at 968.
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possibility of third-party enforcement; international law's influence also
derives from the normative force of the ideas it embodies and its capacity to
legitimize negotiated outcomes in the eyes of other international actors and
domestic constituencies. In this respect, I submit, international law may
influence the process and outcome of peace negotiations not only as a result of
the shadow it casts, but also as a result of the shade it offers-i.e., the
attributes of legal rules that pull parties to align a negotiated outcome with
them, even when their ultimate enforcement is unlikely.
Applying this framework, I then turn, in Part III, to describing how law
functioned-and failed to function-during Palestinian-Israeli permanent
status negotiations. My analysis draws not only on published first- and third-
party accounts of the negotiations, but also on unpublished draft texts,
memoranda, and minutes prepared by and for the Palestinian negotiating team
during the talks. I
In Part IV, I assess the factors that constrained the functioning of legal
rules in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, analyzing the consequences of the
parties' disagreements about the applicability and determinacy of legal rules
and about the efficacy of the outcomes they were claimed to prescribe, as well
as the lack of recourse to external adjudication and enforcement. I conclude
by suggesting steps that may be taken by the parties and the international
community to address these factors. Ultimately, I argue neither that
international law provides answers to all of the questions presented by the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, nor that it offers no answers at all. Instead, I
submit that by understanding how law functions in international negotiations,
and its limitations in that context, it is possible to use law more effectively to
advance the cause of peacemaking-both as a tool for efficient resolution of
disputed issues and as a means of promoting compliance with international
standards of fairness.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
How do international legal norms influence peace negotiations? What
functions can and should law serve in that setting? To answer these questions,
this Part introduces a new theoretical framework, synthesizing efforts by
contract and negotiation theorists to describe how law functions in the context
of private ordering and studies by international law and international relations
11. As legal adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team from September 1999 to June 2001, 1
was involved in the preparation of some of these documents, and I was subsequently given access to
other Palestinian records during my research on this project. Most of the materials I used were drawn
from the electronic files of the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) of the Negotiations Affairs
Department. Having worked at the NSU during the period I describe in this Article, I am able to confirm
the authenticity of the documents cited. Because the files are electronic and are not uniformly write-
protected, however, it is possible (though unlikely) that minor alterations were made to them in the years
since they were first prepared.
Although I have drawn upon published accounts by Israeli and American officials involved in
the negotiations, I did not seek access to Israeli or United States government records. It is my hope that a
fuller analysis of law's roles in the talks will be possible when these records enter the public domain.
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scholars regarding the factors influencing compliance with legal rules1 2 at the
international level.
A. The Functions of Legal Rules in Private Ordering
Law is not, of course, the only factor that shapes the preferences and
positions of participants in a bargaining process. Often, it is not even a
primary factor: Summarizing a series of empirical studies of contracting
behavior, Jay Feinman observes that, "when 'contracting,' people do not
usually consciously shape their conduct to conform to the requirements of the
law or to achieve certain legal effects; ... often [parties] are unlikely to know
of the content of the law or of the legal consequences of their actions."
' 13
Indeed, many factors, other than legal rights and obligations, have been found
to influence bargaining behavior, including the economic costs and benefits of
reaching agreement' 4 and of continuing to negotiate;' 5 interests in maintaining
an ongoing relationship with the other party; 16 social norms; 17 cultural
difference; 8 power disparities;
19 even spite or distrust. E2
To acknowledge that legal rules are not the only--or even the primary-
determinant of negotiated outcomes is not to suggest that they lack effect
entirely. But how does law influence negotiations? In their article, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser examined how the formal legal system affects dispute settlement
outside of court in the context of divorce settlement negotiations. As Professor
Mnookin later explained, their "core idea is encapsulated by the 'shadow'
metaphor: expectations about what might happen in court affect resolutions
negotiated outside of court. The law's shadow is cast by legal rules and
procedures, as well as by other institutional features of the formal legal
12. In this Article, I use the terms "legal norms" and "legal rules" interchangeably, as is the
convention in American international law literature. I do not treat them as the terms of art they represent
in regime theory literature. See, e.g., ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (1984) (defining "norms" as "standards of behavior
defined in terms of rights and obligations," and "rules" as "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action").
13. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1305-06
(1990).
14. Such analysis is the stock and trade of Law and Economics scholars. For a recent
treatment, see generally Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEo. L.J. 1789
(2000) (proposing a framework for analyzing negotiation processes based on economic choices parties
face at each stage of bargaining).
15. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 971-72.
16. See, e.g., Ian Macneil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) (describing non-legal
mechanisms employed by parties to enforce obligations in ongoing relationships involving repeat
transactions).
17. See Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 565, 566-72
(1992).
18. See generally RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1992) (examining the effect of cultural difference on
negotiating styles).
19. See generally Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GA 7T/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002) (reflecting on the differences
between law-based and power-based bargaining in GATT and WTO legislative forums).
20. See Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle, in THE DARK
SIDE OF THE FORCE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT THEORY 131, 133 (Jack Hirshleifer ed.,
2001); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 974-75.
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system." 21 Drawing on sociological data, Mnookin and Kornhauser found that
parties' negotiating behavior is influenced by "the bargaining endowments
created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a court will impose
if the parties fail to reach agreement." While parties may choose to conclude
an agreement that departs from the allocation of rights and obligations that the
law would prescribe if they litigated instead of negotiating, the anticipated
results of that potential litigation give parties "bargaining chips" 23 that shape
their preferences and positions. The value of these bargaining chips is affected
by "the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to
court" and "the parties' attitudes towards risk.",2 4 Thus, because legal rules
''cast a shadow" over negotiations to the extent that they are likely to be
imposed by a court if negotiations fail, the length of their shadow derives from
the probability of such enforcement, which, in turn, depends on the
determinacy of the rules in question and the costs of seeking enforcement.
Mnookin and Komhauser acknowledged that legal rules also serve other
functions in the bargaining process-determining, for example, who is
entitled to participate and the form an agreement must take25 and defining
minimum standards with which an agreement must conform.26 They argued,
however, that "the primary purpose of the legal . . . system should be to
provide a framework for private ordering." 27 "After all," they asked, "who can
better evaluate the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements than
the parties themselves?"
28
Law's role in facilitating and constraining private ordering by bargaining
parties has been further elaborated in more recent studies by contract and
negotiation scholars. In one recent article, Russell Korobkin offers a
framework and vocabulary for analyzing bargaining processes that are
particularly useful for understanding the functions of law. He suggests that
negotiations comprise two distinct (though at times sequentially overlapping)
phases: "zone definition" and "surplus allocation." During the former,
negotiating parties undertake to identify the substantive "bargaining zone"
within which a deal is possible-i.e., "the distance between the reservation
points (or 'walkaway' points) of the two parties. ' 30 To put it in simple
commercial terms, if the highest price one party is willing to pay is lower than
the lowest price at which the other party is willing to sell, the parties lack a
bargaining zone, and they both will prefer to walk away from the deal. On the
other hand, if the parties' bargaining zone comprises a number of different
potential "deal points," they then engage in a process of allocating the
21. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449,
1494 (1991) (quoting commentary by Prof. Mnookin).
22. Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 9, at 966.
23. Id. at 968.
24. Id. at 966.
25. See id. at 951.
26. See id. at 955, 957.
27. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 1494 (quoting commentary by Prof. Mnookin).
28. Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 9, at 957.
29. Korobkin, supra note 14, at 1791-92.
30. Id.
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economic "surplus," undertaking to persuade each other of the merits of their
respective preferred outcomes.
31
Legal rules may influence the parties' attempts both to determine
whether they share a bargaining zone ("zone definition") and to persuade each
other of the merits of their respective preferred outcomes within that zone
("surplus allocation"). Legal rules contribute to zone definition insofar as each
party's reservation point is determined by the party's "best alternative to a
negotiated agreement" (BATNA),32 because the BATNA is shaped, in part, by
the perceived availability, costs and contours of a legal remedy.33 In other
words, a party will walk away from a deal that is more costly to her than the
result that the law is likely to provide if no deal is reached. This kind of
influence is essentially the "shadow of the law" that Mnookin and Komhauser
described.34
Legal rules, like other "community norms of either procedural or
substantive fairness," may also be invoked by the parties during the process of
surplus allocation as part of their effort to persuade their counterpart of the
virtues of a specific negotiated outcome. 35 Two characteristics of legal rules
make them well suited to serve this function. First, because legal rules often
are based on majority practices, 36 they provide bargaining parties with an
indication of best practices in similar circumstances and, accordingly, a
standard on which to base arguments for or against various potential deal
points within their bargaining zone.37 Second, because legal rules are defined
"independent of each side's will," they provide an objective basis for
evaluating the merits of various proposed deal points. 38 Both of these
characteristics of legal rules make them potentially powerful tools for
persuading an adversary of the virtues of a particular deal.
In addition to influencing what the parties choose to put into an
agreement, legal rules may influence what they omit from it. As Allan
Farnsworth explains, "It has become common in English to refer to [certain]
rules as default rules, by analogy to the default settings on a computer, since
they are subject to contrary agreement but apply by default absent such
agreement." Because parties to an agreement cannot foresee every
contingency that may arise (and may find it excessively costly to negotiate in
31. Id.
32. The expression was coined by Roger Fisher and William Ury. See ROGER FISHER ET AL.,
GETrNG TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991).
33. See Korobkin, supra note 14, at 1800-01.
34. See Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra note 9.
35. Korobkin, supra note 14, at 1792.
36. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 821-26 (1992).
37. See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457, 476
(2001) (discussing how contract law may have to adapt specifically for internet business and use default
rules that follow fiduciary law to reflect the best practices of industries conducting business on the
internet); Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium: Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 117 (2002)
(discussing the benefits of having default rules that reflect best practices in the employment context).
38. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 32, at 85.
39. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.10, at 36 (3d ed. 1999). Examples of default rules
in the domestic context include the rule in many states providing for maternal custody of the children in
the event of divorce and the rule, under the Uniform Commercial Code, that an offeree respond to an
offer within a reasonable time.
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advance how to address even those they do foresee), all agreements are to
some extent incomplete; and default rules provide some indication of how a
court will fill in the gaps. 40 Accordingly, parties may decide as much by
failing to-or choosing not to-address a particular issue in an agreement as
by addressing it, at least insofar as legal rules are available to serve as gap-
fillers and recourse is available to a forum capable of interpreting the
agreement and the relevant law.
All three of the functions of legal rules described above-facilitating
zone definition by helping each party to determine its BATNA, providing a
persuasive standard for sLrplus allocation, and filling in gaps in the parties'
agreement-are based on an essentially instrumental view of the law. Legal
rules, in this conception, are relevant only to the extent that they are useful to
the parties. What is at issue here is efficiency: even though legal rules may be
designed to provide for an outcome that is fair or sensible, their value in the
bargaining process derives not from their fairness or good sense but, instead,
from their potential to reduce transaction costs-either by helping parties to
predict the outcome of litigation or by providing ready, tested solutions to
issues on the table, making it unnecessary for the parties to incur the costs of
negotiating solutions to them. Insofar as law exists to facilitate private
ordering, parties are free to agree to terms in accordance with legal rules or to
terms that depart from them, if they so prefer. The assumption in both cases is
that the parties themselves are in the best position to determine how to
allocate costs and benefits between them.
What this emphasis on facilitating efficient private ordering overlooks,
however, is the normative function of law. Contracts theorists recognize a
distinction between "default" rules and "mandatory" rules4 1 (sometimes called
"immutable" rules). 42 Unlike default rules, mandatory rules may not be varied
or waived by negotiating parties, even if both would choose to do so. Because
the law of contracts is a system generally designed to permit, even encourage,
parties to order their legal relations according to their own perceived interests
and priorities, mandatory rules are rare.43 Their primary purpose is not, like
default rules, to facilitate efficient choices by bargaining parties. Instead, they
operate forcibly to inject standards of procedural or substantive fairness into
the bargaining process. According to Ian Ayres, these constraints may be
"justified either by 'externalities' or 'paternalism' in that lawmakers might
make rules mandatory to protect people not in contractual privity (e.g., as in
the mandatory prohibition of criminal conspiracies) or to protect people who
are parties to the contract itself (e.g., as in the mandatory prohibition against
40. See Barnett, supra note 36, at 821-26.
41. The term "mandatory rules" has a more specialized definition in the conflict of laws
context than the one applied here. See Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law
Limit Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration?, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 59, 62-63
(1992).
42. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989).
43. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 1.10, at 36. Examples of mandatory rules in the
domestic context include the implied obligation of good faith and the warranty of habitability.
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contracting with infants)."' 44 Thus, whereas default rules are concerned
primarily with efficiency, mandatory rules are concerned primarily with
fairness. Whereas default rules inform parties' choices about where the soft
borders of their bargaining zone should be, mandatory rules comprise the hard
borders of what may be called the "zone of lawfulness." Deal points outside
that zone, while potentially acceptable to both parties, are not sanctioned by
law.
It is consequently the case that the existence of mandatory rules
forecloses certain deals that parties may otherwise have found it in their
common interest to reach. Indeed, as Ayres observes, the enforcement of
mandatory rules may serve in individual cases to leave the very parties the
rules are intended to protect worse off, depriving them of the benefits that
even a poor deal would offer.45 As described in the next Section, this tension
between the desire to promote adherence to legal rules that represent
collective standards of fairness, on the one hand, and the desire to support any
deal that will bring a dispute to an end, on the other, has been particularly
acute in peacemaking efforts.
Taking this body of theory as a whole, legal norms serve one or more of
the following functions in a bargaining process. Norms considered mandatory
rules define a zone of lawfulness for negotiations, i.e., standards of procedural
and substantive fairness that the parties may not lawfully contravene, even if
they would prefer to do so. Norms not considered mandatory rules-i.e.,
default rules-may in turn serve several functions. First, they may help parties
to define their bargaining zone; depending on their determinacy, these rules
allow parties to anticipate the contours of a legal remedy should negotiations
fail, facilitating definition of their respective BATNAs and, accordingly, their
reservation points. Second, these norms may contribute to efficient surplus
allocation by providing the parties with objective standards for choosing
among potential deals. And, third, they may help a court to fill in gaps that the
parties intentionally or unintentionally failed to resolve.
B. International Bargaining: Analogies and Contrasts
Does law play the same roles in public international negotiations that it
plays in private ordering at the domestic level? The analogy between the two
contexts, while inexact, is not incidental. In 1946, Hans Morgenthau observed
(with some dismay) that "[t]he application of domestic legal experience to
international law is really the main stock in trade of modem international
thought., 46 And, indeed, when the drafters of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (hereinafter "Vienna Convention") undertook to codify
customary international norms governing the making and breaking of
44. Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 897, 901 (1999).
45. Ayres notes, for example, that the "mandatory prohibition against usurious interest rates
might limit the ability of high-risk consumers to borrow money or might induce sellers with bargaining
power to extract their profits in a less efficient manner." Id. at 901-02.
46. HANS MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS 113 (1946). As discussed
further below, the conviction that the analogy between the domestic and international order is false lies
at the center of the political philosophy articulated by Morgenthau and other Realists.
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agreements between states, they drew substantially upon general principles of
domestic contract law.47 Accordingly, like a domestic contract, a treaty is
voidable if conceived through fraud4 or mistake,49 and void if consent to it is
procured through coercion.
5
Although each of the functions served by legal rules in domestic
bargaining have analogues in public international negotiations, the aptness of
the analogy has been challenged. Skeptics ask how law can cast a shadow
over negotiations when its content is unclear and its enforcement is unlikely.
This Section examines both the analogies and the differences between law's
roles in domestic and international bargaining. I conclude by arguing that the
function of law in international negotiations is not confined to "casting a
shadow" over talks-i.e., its influence is not simply a function of the legal
sanction that will follow if no deal is reached. Drawing on recent international
law and international relations scholarship, I suggest that law's influence is
also a consequence of the shade it offers. By this I mean the attributes of legal
rules that pull parties to reach an agreement in conformity with them even
when enforcement is unlikely.
1. Analogies
Analogies may be drawn between each of the functions legal rules serve
in the domestic setting and their roles in public international bargaining.
As in the domestic setting, mandatory rules of international law are rare.
Under the Vienna Convention, a treaty is unenforceable if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of international law, which is defined as "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted .... ,,51 Thus, an international
agreement may not contravene certain legal rules-rules embodying the
international community's most fundamental notions of fairness-even if both
parties to the agreement would otherwise consent to do so. 52 In theory at least,
jus cogens norms therefore represent the mandatory rules of international
47. See A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus Cogens, as Illustrated by the
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (1995). Indeed, delegations to the Conference
raised the concern that elements of the International Law Commission's draft text were "based on 'the
mechanical and unconsidered application of rules of internal private law to public international law...
'" IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 174 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Ist Sess., 45th mtg. at 256, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/I1 (Apr. 30,
1968)).
48. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 49, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VIENNA CONVENTION].
49. Id. art. 48.
50. Id. art. 52. See also Benedetto Conforti & Angelo Labella, Invalidity and Termination of
Treaties: The Role of National Courts, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 44, 50-52 (1990) (citing decisions of three
Netherlands courts that concluded that the German-Czechoslovak Nationality Treaty was void because it
was concluded under unlawful duress).
51. VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 48, art. 53.
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 331 (2),
cmt. e (noting that while the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, "it is generally accepted that
there are some peremptory rules of international law that are of superior status and cannot be affected by
treaty").
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law53 and may be seen to form the hard edges of the zone of lawfulness within
which states may negotiate. Although state practice in this area is extremely
limited, 54 most international jurists "have accepted the principle that there
may exist norms of international law so fundamental to the maintenance of an
international legal order that a treaty concluded in violation of them is a
nullity." 55 It is difficult, for example, to conceive of a judicial tribunal's
enforcing an agreement that provided for rendition to torture, transfer of slave
labor, or cooperation in perpetrating genocide. 56 And even outside of the
human rights context, judges of the International Court of Justice have
suggested that a treaty reservation contrary to a jus cogens norm would be
void.
5 7
The function of international law in international negotiation processes
is not, however, limited to defining the boundaries of what is lawfully
negotiable. In addition, legal rules may contribute to zone definition by
helping a party to define its reservation point. As Roger Fisher observes, "law
cannot restrain a government from doing what they [sic] want, but law affects
what they [sic] want., 58 Examining the actions of the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, Fisher suggests that
"[i]nternational law affected what the United States decided to try for": while
American military authorities likely would have preferred to acquire and study
Soviet missiles, "the United States had no legal right to seize those missiles,
or even to destroy them." As a consequence, Fisher argues, the United States
settled on a set of narrower objectives, including removal of existing missiles
from Cuba, commitment not to install additional missiles there, and
verification. 59 Louis Henkin reaches similar conclusions in his own analysis of
the Cuban Missile Crisis. While acknowledging that "[n]o one can say exactly
what factors, in what degree, weighed in the decision" between a ground
invasion of Cuba, bombing of Soviet bases, and the "quarantine" ultimatey
chosen, he suggests that "legal considerations were not insignificant,"
53. For a thoughtful discussion of the domestic analogue to jus cogens rules, see SINCLAIR,
supra note 47, at 204-07.
54. Id. at 215,222.
55. Id. at 222; see also Jochen Abr. Frowein, Jus Cogens, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984).
56. Cf. United States v. Alfred Krupp, reprinted in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10, 1395 (1950) (finding that
agreement providing for use of French prisoners of war as slave labor in German armament factories
was contra bonus mores and consequently void); John Dugard & Christine Van Den Wyngaert,
Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 198 (1998) (arguing that a party to
an extradition agreement may refuse to extradite a person likely to be tortured by the receiving state
because prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm).
57. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1968 1.C.J. 3, 182
(Oct. 12) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka) (concluding that a reservation contrary to a jus cogens
norm, such as the "essential principle of the continental shelf institution" would be void); id. at 97
(dissenting opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo) (concluding that jus cogens norms cannot be subject to
unilateral reservations).
58. ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS 163 (1969).
59. Id.; see also HENKIN, supra note 2, at 282-83.
60. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 286. Similarly, Abram Chayes argues that it is possible to
determine "how" law influences decision-making, but not "how much," observing, "It is no more
possible to demonstrate 'proximate' causation [in U.S. decision making during the Cuban missile crisis]
... than in any other human process. The weight and consequence of legal advice in the final decision,
like the weight and consequence of military judgment or Kennedy's machismo or the bureaucratic
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explaining that concerns about the perceived legitimacy of the U.S. response
among Latin American countries affected thc choice among these options.
61
Thus, although a variety of political and security factors influenced American
decision-making (not least, Soviet nuclear weapons), it seems likely that U.S.
officials' assessment of what international law permitted, and of the cost of
pursuing a remedy that would be regarded as a violation of international law,
informed their definition of the United States's reservation point.
Legal rules may also contribute to zone definition by affecting the
credibility of an adversary's reservation point. Fisher's analysis of the Cuban
missile crisis is again instructive. Fisher argues that the United States's
decisions to involve international institutions and to invoke international
norms in support of its proposed blockade of Cuba gave it bargaining chips in
its negotiations with the Soviet Union; he observes:
By making offers and threats more legitimate, the law not only made them more
acceptable; it also made them more credible .... The stronger the United States's legal
case, the more credible each of these threats [became], and the less costly it would have
been to the United States to carry them out. The international procedures followed and
the legal rhetoric advanced in support of the United States position thus operated to make
the threats more influential .
62
Fisher's account suggests that by rendering its alternative to a negotiated
outcome (its BATNA) more credible, the United States's invocation of legal
norms also made its declared reservation point-the minimum it would accept
from the Soviet Union-more credible. In essence, the message conveyed by
American officials to their Soviet counterparts was the following: "The law
entitles us to the fulfillment of certain minimum demands; if you are unwilling
to accept them, we will walk away from the deal and pursue an alternative
remedy." Of course, the United States's alternative remedy was not recourse
to an adjudicative tribunal with enforcement capacity, as might be the case in
the domestic setting, but rather, its own use of force. 63 By obtaining the
imprimatur of international norms and institutions, however, the United States
made its own use of force a more potent threat than it otherwise is likely to
rigidity of the Air Force are, and must remain, unknowable." ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 4-5 (1974).
61. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 287-88. Henkin argues that while American concerns about Latin
American perceptions of the crisis were political in nature, they "merely vindicate[d] the international
norm and reflect[ed] the interests that [led] nations to accept it." Id. at 287. Indeed, as Henkin observes,
the choice of the word "quarantine" also points to a U.S. desire to bolster the perceived legal legitimacy
of its action: "The use of the word 'quarantine,' a legally neutral term, also suggests the lawyer's
influence; it ...emphasized that the action was limited and 'pacific,' while 'blockade' might have
suggested war and belligerency." Id. at 289, n.'. Henkin's and Fisher's assessments are supported by
evidence made available as a result of the declassification of executive branch materials on the missile
crisis. See Timothy J. McKeown, Plans and Routines, Bureaucratic Bargaining, and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 63 J. POL. 1163, 1167-69 (2001) (describing discussion among executive branch officials about
anticipated legal consequences of blockade of Cuba); Norbert A. Schlei, Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6
GREEN BAG 2d 195, 201 (2003) (reproducing memorandum from Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel examining international legal implications of various responses to potential establishment
of missile bases in Cuba by the Soviet Union and recommending measures consistent with international
law-some of which were adopted by Kennedy administration).
62. FISHER, supra note 58, at 171; see also HENKIN, supra note 2, at 290-93 (describing U.S.
international law arguments before the Organization of American States).
63. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 286.
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have been. Thus, even though the avenues of enforcement of international
legal rules are different than those in the domestic setting (a difference
addressed further below), the effect on bargaining of their potential
enforcement--"the shadow of the law" described by Mnookin and
Kornhauser-is qualitatively the same.
In addition to facilitating zone definition, legal norms may provide
standards for surplus allocation. As Joaquin Tacsan points out, "[t]hough
parties to international disputes have certainly been known to manipulate
international law in decidedly non-legal ways, such parties often enough
choose to bargain on legal grounds because international law permits less of a
range of manipulative calculation than other types of bargaining." 64 In his
study of the Central American peace process in the 1980s, Tacsan observes
that the parties sought to base their agenda on "absolute respect for the
principles of self-determination and nonintervention," using these principles
"as the common conflict-resolution criteria to guide the negotiations. 65
The use of legal concepts may also obviate the need for parties to define
every aspect of their relationship in their agreement. The relative precision of
legal language-the possibility of "conveying a great deal of meaning" with
relative economy through reference to established norms and standardized
terms-makes it a valuable vehicle of communication between governments,
66both during negotiations and in agreements. For example, an agreement
delimiting the maritime boundary between two sovereign states need not
include an exhaustive description of each state's rights on its side of the
boundary. Because those rights are defined by international law, the parties
can confine their bargaining to the issues with respect to which a departure
from the norm is sought. International legal rules therefore may offer
negotiating parties a starting-point for bargaining or, alternatively, a default
position with which gaps in their agreement may subsequently be filled.
As these examples suggest, legal rules serve functions in international
negotiations that, in many ways, are analogous to those they serve in domestic
bargaining. But how far does the analogy go? In what ways do the
idiosyncrasies of international law and institutions alter the roles that legal
norms play in international bargaining?
2. Contrasts
Skeptics submit that the analogy between the international and domestic
settings is false or, at best, misleading. They highlight two primary differences
between the two contexts. First, they argue that the influence of law on
64. TACSAN, supra note 4, at 187.
65. Id. at 189. Tacsan argues that the indeterminacy of these norms limited their usefulness as
standards. Id. at 189-90. The challenge presented by the indeterminacy of international legal rules is
addressed further below.
66. FISHER, supra note 58, at 167.
67. See Faraz Sanei, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Prospects
for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran 's Legal Options with Its
Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681, 800-01 (2001) (suggesting that application of
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as a framework for resolving Caspian Sea resource disputes
would facilitate clear definition of littoral states' rights within their respective exclusive economic
zones).
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bargaining between governments is constrained by the indeterminacy of
international legal rules, suggesting that international law's relative lack of
development makes it difficult for negotiating parties to discern its meaning
and implications and, accordingly, to use it effectively as a tool in
negotiations. Second, they argue that the influence of law in domestic settings
derives largely from the availability of some form of legal recourse, pointing
out that enforcement of claimed legal rights at the international level is usually
a remote prospect. I consider each of these arguments in turn.
a. Indeterminacy of International Norms
A rule's "determinacy" is the extent to which it "convey[s] a clear
message" such that "one can see through the language of a law to its essential
meaning. ' 68 According to Thomas Franck, the determinacy of a legal rule is
"[t]he pre-eminent literary property affecting legitimacy." 69 Determinacy
enables "states or persons to whose conduct the rule is directed [to] know
more precisely what is expected of them, which is a necessary first step
toward compliance." 70 Conversely, indeterminacy renders a rule so malleable
that it is easier for a party to justify non-compliance with it.71 In the context of
bargaining, indeterminacy constrains the capacity of legal rules to serve the
functions described above: It undermines their usefulness as predictors of the
remedy a court (or other tribunal) would impose, making it more difficult for
parties to assess the costs and benefits of a non-negotiated resolution of their
conflict; 72 and it erodes the persuasive force of rules as objective standards for
surplus allocation, resulting in differences between negotiating parties about
how a given rule bears on an issue in contention.
73
Are international legal rules sufficiently determinate to give them
influence over international negotiations? Skeptics point out that even the
mandatory rules of international law-jus cogens norms-are indeterminate in
important respects. 74 Though hardly a skeptic himself, Ian Brownlie
acknowledges that "more authority exists for the category of jus cogens than
exists for its particular content."'7 Indeed, the Vienna Convention is silent
about which rules are jus cogens norms, its drafters apparently having sought
to avoid both "misunderstanding as to the position concerning other cases not
mentioned in the article" and "prolonged study of matters which fall outside,,76
the scope of the present articles. In its commentary to Article 50 of the
68. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 30 (1995)
[hereinafter FAIRNESS].
69. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 52 (1990).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 54.
72. See Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 9, at 969 (explaining that the "lack of precision"
of legal rules in the divorce context provides "a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty").
73. See TACSAN, supra note 4, at 190-94 (observing that "ambiguity of legal norms" can result
in manipulation of legal arguments by the parties, diminishing their value as objective standards).
74. See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 47, at 21-22.
75. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (3d ed. 1979).
76. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its Seventeenth
Session and on its Eighteenth Session, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. I (1966),
reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 248, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
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Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission did provide one
illustration, characterizing "the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition
of the use of force" as "a conspicuous example of a rule in international law
having the character of jus cogens. ' 77 Other norms suggested for inclusion by
various state delegations to the Vienna Conference included "the right to self-
determination, human rights norms, rules of humanitarian law in warfare, and
prohibitions of genocide, racial discrimination, and unequal treaties., 78 None
of these rules, however, obtained the universal recognition of delegations to
the Conference.79
This lack of consensus among the conferees in Vienna points to a larger
tension in the international legal system. In addition to still unresolved
questions about which international rules are non-derogable, and which may
be negotiated around, the substantive contours of recognized peremptory
norms remain a subject of controversy. For example, the norm of self-
determination, to which the jus cogens label has been attached, 80 has proved to
be difficult to apply with any coherence. As Cherif Bassiouni explains:
"Self-determination" is a catch-all concept which exists as a principle, develops into a
right under certain circumstances, unfolds as a process and results in a remedy. As an
abstract principle it can be enunciated without reference to a specific context; as a right it
is operative only in a relative context, and as a remedy, its equitable application is limited
by the rights of others and the potential injuries it may inflict as weighed against the
potential benefits it may generate.
8'
Some scholars submit that the indeterminacy of the norm of self-
determination and the international community's failure to provide guidance
as to its meaning in various contexts have prevented the rule from contributing
constructively to resolution of the conflicts in which it has been invoked.82
The application of even clearly defined jus cogens norms has also
proven difficult in some cases, particularly when strict adherence to the norm
has been seen to undermine competing values. Thus, although the rule against
the acquisition of territory by force has universally recognized jus cogens
status, the international community, in the interest of bringing an end to armed
hostilities, has endorsed agreements whose terms arguably derogated
significantly from the rule. 83 Similarly, questions have arisen about the
lawfulness, in the context of a peace agreement, of granting amnesty to
77. Id. at 247.
78. Weisburd, supra note 47, at 16. See also Colim Campbell, Peace and the laws of war: The
role of international humanitarian law in the post-conflict environment, 839 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 627,
632 (2000) (suggesting that a peace agreement granting formal amnesty to perpetrators of grave
breaches of humanitarian law would be unlawful).
79. Weisburd, supra note 47, at 16.
80. See BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 513; LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS 'Jus
COGENS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 424 (1988)
(recognizing self-determination as a peremptory norm insofar as applied to "colonial-type domination").
81. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Self-Determination " and the Palestinians, 65 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 31, 33 (1971).
82. CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 176-187 (2000) (examining
Palestinian-Israeli and Balkan conflicts); TACSAN, supra note 4, at 81, 107-09 (examining Contadora
process); WATSON, supra note 7, at 270-72 (examining Palestinian-Israeli conflict).
83. See also Francis A. Boyle, Negating Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS.
Q. 515, 515-16 (1996); Weisburd, supra note 47, at 42-43 (pointing out that Dayton Peace Accord
sanctioned forcible acquisition of territory by Serbia and Montenegro).
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perpetrators of grave breaches of humanitarian law or violations of
fundamental human rights.84 Because international law is derived in part from
state practice, efforts to address equitable concerns in peace agreements by
departing from the outcome that legal norms would appear to prescribe
arguably serve to render the norms less determinate (at least at their margins),
further constraining their influence on international negotiations.
The case, however, should not be overstated. Determinacy, after all, is
relative and situational: Although international legal rules may often prove
indeterminate at their margins, the basic precepts of some rules are
sufficiently determinate to allow parties to identify conduct that clearly
contravenes them. Thomas Franck offers the following example from the
litigation between the United States and Nicaragua in the International Court
of Justice in the 1980s: Although the United States's reservation to its
acceptance of the International Court of Justice's compulsory jurisdiction
barred the Court from adjudicating any case involving "domestic" matters, as
determined by the United States, the United States refrained from claiming
that the mining of Nicaragua's harbors was a domestic matter, though doing
so would have brought an immediate end to Nicaragua's suit against it.85 Even
though the definition of the term "domestic" was undoubtedly elastic at its
margins, and subject to interpretation only by the United States, it was
sufficiently determinate for certain conduct-the mining of another state's
harbors-to fall clearly outside its scope.
86
Moreover, the existence of differences between bargaining parties
regarding the interpretation of rules does not necessarily indicate that the rules
in question are indeterminate. As in the domestic setting, parties to
international negotiations may adopt an interpretation of a rule that is at odds
with a widely accepted understanding of its meaning. But whereas in the
domestic setting recourse is available to a judicial tribunal capable of
resolving the alleged ambiguity in the rule, the lack of robust international
adjudicative and enforcement mechanisms can make it difficult to resolve
even spurious claims of indeterminacy. Accordingly, it may be unclear what is
prompting non-compliance-the rule's indeterminacy or the lack of recourse
to a third party capable of interpreting and enforcing it. It is to the latter that I
turn next.
b. Lack of International Adjudicative and
Enforcement Mechanisms
Of the four functions of legal rules in negotiations that are described in
the Sections above, three assume the availability of recourse to a forum
capable of adjudicating and enforcing legal claims: mandatory rules will only
appear credibly mandatory if transgressions are likely to elicit some form of
sanction; and the usefulness of default rules, either as predictors of the
84. See Campbell, supra note 78, at 632; Ellen L. Lutz, Eileen F. Babbitt & Hurst Hannum,
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioner's Perspectives, 27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD
AFF. 173 (2003).
85. See FAIRNESS, supra note 68, at 32.
86. Id.
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contours of a non-negotiated outcome or as gap-fillers, turns on the
expectation that some forum is positioned to impose a legal remedy if the
parties fail to reach agreement on some or all of the issues in dispute. But if no
such forum is available, or if recourse to it is unavailable, is law's role in
negotiations limited to its persuasive power? And, if so, can a government be
persuaded to accept a legal rule as a standard for prioritizing competing claims
if it perceives compliance with the rule to be at odds with other interests?
The influence of international law on state behavior has been the focus
of considerable attention by international relations and international law
scholars. Realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau answer these questions in no
uncertain terms. Characterizing the international system as "a competitive
quest for power," Morgenthau expressed profound skepticism about the
influence of international law on the decisions of states. 8From the Realist
perspective, international law is "epiphenomenal" 88: The effectiveness of legal
rules is contingent upon the threat of enforcement or sanction when the rule is
violated; if such enforcement is left to individual states, as it is at the
international level, the effectiveness of law is a function merely of states'
relative power to sanction one another and their respective interests in doing
so. 89 Accordingly, governments will not be constrained--or persuaded-by
the invocation of legal rules to accept negotiated outcomes that they do not
judge otherwise to be in their interests. Absent the threat of enforcement, law
has no influence.
The response to the "Realist challenge" has been manifold. 90 Some
scholars assert that Realists begin from the wrong starting-point by overstating
the influence of enforcement in the domestic setting. Roger Fisher, for
example, points out that "[f]or those in whose conduct we are interested-
national governments-domestic law is backed up by less force than is
international law,"9 1 observing that governments "regularly comply with court
decisions" even though courts lack the power independently to enforce their
judgments against governments. 92 Governments do so because courts are
"respected and disinterested," because judicial rulings take the form of
"narrow and explicit demand[s]" rather than general rules, and because a
decision to defy a court "would establish a disastrous precedent which others
87. Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L.
260, 283 (1941).
88. Hathaway, supra note 3, at 1945-46 (observing that according to the Realist approach, "if
compliance with international law occurs, it is not because the law is effective, but merely because
compliance is coincident with the path dictated by self-interest in a world governed by anarchy and
relative state power").
89. See Morgenthau, supra note 87, at 276-78; see also Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the
Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 488
(1988) (identifying five propositions that form the "core" of Realism, one of which is that international
institutions will have only marginal effects on cooperation between states).
90. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory:
A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L 205, 207-220 (1993) (describing "Realist challenge" and cataloguing
responses to it from different schools of international law and international relations theory).
91. FISHER, supra note 58, at 152.
92. Id. at 154.
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might follow. '93 Fisher suggests that the decisions of international courts and
other international tribunals elicit compliance for similar reasons.
94
Other responses to the Realist challenge have focused on the normative
force of international legal norms, on the benefits of participation in
international regimes, on the attitudes of domestic constituencies, or on the
interaction of these factors. While it is not the purpose of this Article to assess
the merits of the various perspectives advanced by compliance theorists, their
central propositions, taken together, provide a useful framework for analyzing
how the influence of legal rules in international negotiations differs from its
influence in the domestic setting.
Oona Hathaway categorizes international law compliance theories into
two primary models: "rational-actor" models and "normative" models. 95
Rational-actor models, she explains, "have at their heart a shared belief that
states and the individuals who guide them are rational, self-interested actors
who calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in the
international realm and act accordingly." 96 The role of international law, from
this perspective, is defined in instrumental terms-as one of a number of tools
through which parties pursue their self-interest.
97
Some rational-actor models, however, depart from the Realist assertion
that law is effective only to justify decisions that would have been taken for
other reasons. 98 Institutionalists, for example, argue that states comply with
international law because participation in international institutions is useful to
them, providing a means of achieving long-term goals that require at least a
certain degree of cooperation with other international actors. 99 Thus,
international law influences behavior insofar as failure to comply with it leads
to reputational costs that diminish access to the benefits of participating in
international regimes. "[B]y clustering issues together in the same forums
over a long period of time, [international regimes] help to bring governments
into continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and
enhancing the value of reputation."'' 00 Liberal theorists, on the other hand,
depart from the conception of the state as a unitary actor, submitting that a
central factor in a government's compliance decisions is the existence of
pressure from their domestic constituencies. 101 Accordingly, it is the
internalization of international rules by persons and institutions within the
93. Id. at 156.
94. See id. at 158-59.
95. See Hathaway, supra note 3, at 1944-62.
96. Id. at 1944.
97. See id.
98. See Arend, supra note 3, at 115-16.
99. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 244-45; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory ofInternational Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1826-27 (2002).
100. KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 244-45. See also Hathaway, supra note 3, at 1950; Arend,
supra note 3, at 120.
101. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INT'L. ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (arguing that, particularly in democratic states, their very nature
dictates that domestic societal preferences and pressures must shape the state preferences that are
projected internationally). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 503 (1995) (offering an overview of liberal theory and its implications for
international law).
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state and the pressure they exert that influence state behavior, not merely the
threat of enforcement by external actors.
Normative theorists approach the question of compliance from a
different angle entirely. As Hathaway explains, "Scholars adopting this
approach argue that state decisions cannot be explained simply by calculations
of geopolitical or economic interests or even the relative power of domestic
political groups. A complete description of state action in the international
realm, they argue, requires an understanding of the influence and importance
of ideas." From this perspective, compliance with law is not driven solely
by the threat of enforcement; law also has influence because it is perceived to
be legitimate and just. 10 3 Thomas Franck suggests that a number of factors
affect the legitimacy of rules, including their determinacy and what he calls
their "symbolic validation."' 4 As he explains, "Determinacy communicates
meaning. Symbolic validation communicates authority. Both affect the
legitimacy of a rule or a rule-making or implementing process, its capacity to
pull toward compliance." 105 Symbols, such as the rituals observed in
diplomatic practice, bolster legitimacy by signaling "that authority is being
exercised in accordance with right process, that it is institutionally recognized
and validated."' 0 6 Non-compliance with legal rules may be corrected through
interaction and persuasive discourse at both the international level and the
transnational level, 10 7 through the development of compliance capacity among
governments, and through efforts to bolster the transparency and fairness of
the international processes through which law is made. 108 Through this
"transnational legal process," as Harold Koh has called it, state and non-state
actors "interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international
fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of
transnational law."'
10 9
Thus, although the paucity of enforcement avenues undoubtedly
shortens the shadow cast by international norms on public international
bargaining, the shadow metaphor fails to capture important functions of law in
bargaining between international actors. Legal rules may exert a "pull towards
compliance" 11 as a result of a variety of factors other than the threat of
enforcement. They may influence bargaining behavior because of their
perceived fairness, at least insofar as they were developed pursuant to
processes perceived to be legitimate. They may influence bargaining because
of the reputational costs of non-compliance with them-costs that may hinder
access to beneficial international regimes. And they may influence bargaining
because domestic constituencies demand adherence to them.
102. Hathaway, supra note 3, at 1955.
103. See Koh, supra note 3, at 2602.
104. FAIRNESS, supra note 68, at 34.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Koh, supra note 3, at 2645-58.
108. Id. at 2645.
109. Harold Hongu Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 183-84(1996).
110. FAIRNESS, supra note 68, at 34.
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3. The Shade of the Law
Taken together, these theoretical approaches suggest that international
law may exert influence not only as a result of the shadow it casts over
bargaining, but also by virtue of the shade it offers-that is, its perceived
value, independent of the threat of enforcement, as an objective and legitimate
standard for resolving disputed issues.
Two examples of state practice illustrate these functions. In a recent
study of early settlement in GATT and WTO disputes, Marc Busch and Eric
Reinhardt found that a majority of concessions by defendants took place prior
to the issuance of a formal ruling by a GATT or WTO panel.11" ' Observing
that "[n]either GATT nor the WTO possess centralized enforcement power,
the upshot being that both have relied on the complainant itself to implement
any retaliatory measures that may be authorized,"' 112 and that the threat of such
enforcement alone is "obviously insufficient" to induce concessions in a
majority of cases,1 13 Busch and Reinhardt offer several explanations for the
tendency of states to settle their disputes prior to a formal ruling. They
acknowledge that "the defendant's uncertainty about the complainant's
willingness to implement retaliatory measures (if called upon to do so) is
absolutely necessary to give recalcitrant defendants some interest, however
slight, in cutting a deal in the first place." 114 They suggest, however, that a
number of other factors are also influential:
A panel ruling carries weight to the extent that it delivers a timely and coherent
normative statement on the matter. Even without a credible threat by a complainant to
seek authorization to retaliate, a definitive legal opinion from the institution may
empower groups in the defendant state who oppose the disputed measure. Alternatively, a
ruling may enable the defendant's executive to "tie hands," making concessions more
politically palatable by citing the need to be a "good citizen" of GATT/WTO. A well-
reasoned report may also set a de facto (if not formal) precedent that ... may adversely
affect the defendant's positions in ongoing multilateral trade round talks." 
5
Thus, even though an adverse ruling is often unlikely to be followed by
effective enforcement, the threat of a ruling nevertheless may suffice to
prompt a state to offer concessions in pre-ruling negotiations-because of the
normative force of the ruling (the normativist view), the effect of resulting
reputational costs on the state's participation in the international trade regime
(the institutionalist view), and the likelihood that it will result in domestic
challenges to the disputed practice (the liberal view). As far as these factors
are concerned, it is the shade of the law-not its shadow-that influences
bargaining behavior.'
16
111. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement
in GA TT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 162 (2000).
112. Id. at 163.
113. Id. at 164.
114. Id., at 166.
115. Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
116. Of course, differences between negotiations conducted within the framework of an
international trading regime and those conducted in the context of a peace process may affect the
influence of legal rules in each. For example, a state's voluntary commitment to participation in the
WTO (and the elaborate process by which that commitment is made) may signal a firmer embrace of the
regime's rules - and, accordingly, a greater inclination to comply with them - than the near-automatic
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A second example further illustrates the role that international legal rules
and institutions can play in insulating government actions from domestic
challenges. In 1982, the International Court of Justice accepted a request from
the United States and Canada to establish a special chamber to resolve a
dispute about the two states' maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine,
pursuant to a boundary treaty that entered into force in 1979.117 Earlier efforts
to resolve the countries' contentious dispute over fishing rights in the Gulf had
proven unsuccessful, a fisheries treaty failing to earn ratification in the United
States Senate due to fierce opposition by fishermen and members of Congress
from affected northeastern states. 118 Ultimately, the boundary devised by the
ICJ Chamber split the difference between the two sides. By shifting the
decision to the World Court, however, the political leaders on each side of the
dispute were able to insulate themselves from the dissatisfaction of their
constituents; 120 as the legal adviser who represented the United States at the
ICJ later recounted:
Georges Bank is no longer on the agenda of meetings between the President and the
Prime Minister. So "throwing the matter to the lawyers" was a success in this regard.
That is, a controversy that proved incapable of a compromise negotiated by diplomats
was instead compromised by five judges, allowing the political bosses of both States to
place any dissatisfaction with the result at the feet of the Chamber rather than at their
own. This then is the "realpolitic" point of conjunction between international tribunals
and diplomacy where mutual desperation proved such a potent internal political force in
both States that our masters decided to grant the legal establishment the opportunity to
"do its thing." So, that is what we did and the problem went away.
2 1
Although the Gulf of Maine dispute culminated in joint consent by the parties
to adjudication by an international tribunal, a step that few governments are
prepared to contemplate,122 it nevertheless demonstrates that international law
and institutions can make unpopular political decisions easier by shifting some
of the responsibility for them away from political leaders. 1
23
Indeed, in an international order in which enforcement continues to be
more often the exception than the rule, persuading a negotiating partner to
seek the shade of the law may often be a better strategy than attempting to
invoke its elusive shadow. Such a strategy may take a variety of forms.
membership of states in the United Nations. In addition, the subject matter of the norms implicated in
each context may affect states' willingness to conform their behavior to them. As John Yoo has
observed, Realist scholars "reject[] the notion that international law can govern the use of force because
security is too dear an interest to states." John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 731 (2004).
117. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 1984
I.C.J. 246, 252 (Oct. 12).
118. See Davis R. Robinson, The Convergence of Law and Diplomacy in United States-Canada
Relations: The Precedent ofThe Gulf of Maine Case, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 37, 43 (2000).
119. Id. at 44.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 41-42 (observing that governments generally prefer to retain discretion to
resolve disputes themselves, rather than "rolling the dice" by placing disputes before international
tribunals).
123. According to William Ury, the decision by the governments of Peru and Ecuador to seek
arbitration of their border conflict by the guarantors of a prior treaty between them was motivated by
similar concerns: "With nationalist passions still running strong, political leaders felt it easier to accept a
ruling by others than to make direct concessions to the enemy." WILLIAM L. URY, THE THIRD SIDE: WHY
WE FIGHT AND How WE CAN STOP 152 (2000).
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Institutionalist theory suggests that international legal rules are likely to be
more persuasive-and, consequently, more effective tools for surplus
allocation-if they are linked to participation in an international regime that
offers concrete benefits to participants and imposes costs (even costs short of
formal sanctions) for non-compliance. Liberal theory reveals the importance
of directing efforts at persuasion not just at the government officials who are
the immediate participants in international negotiations, but also at their
domestic constituencies, which are likely to be particularly influential in
democratic states. And normative theory demonstrates both that discourse
about the fairness of legal rules is likely to be more persuasive than rote
recitation of norms and that clarification of the content and implication of
norms by authoritative actors in the international system may increase their
influence even if enforcement capacity is wanting.
As I discuss in Part IV of this Article, these theoretical approaches offer
lessons that may usefully inform future efforts to achieve a negotiated
settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the next Part, however, I
undertake not to look forward, but to look back-at how Palestinians and
Israelis actually used international law during their abortive attempt to
conclude a permanent status agreement between 1999 and 2001.
III. BARGAINING AT THE SHADOW'S EDGE: LEGAL DISCOURSE DURING
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
In a recent forum on the Middle East peace process convened by the
World Council of Churches, Professor Richard Falk and the former speaker of
the Israeli Knesset, Avraam Burg, sparred regarding the appropriate role of
law in Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts. Falk suggested that "The principal
flaw in the Oslo peace process-and the problem with the Geneva Accord-is
that both exclude the relevance of international law from the process."' 2 4 Burg
"asserted that peace would only succeed if peace negotiators focus directly on
the practical concerns of ordinary citizens, rather than 'theoretical'
international norms." 125 These disparate assessments of the utility and
limitations of international law in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, delivered
several years after the suspension of the peace talks, mirror a persistent debate
between the parties themselves. It is beyond the scope of this Article to trace
the specific substantive contours of the parties' legal positions regarding each
of the issues they were negotiating. Instead, drawing upon the theoretical
framework defined in Part II, I undertake here to examine how the parties used
international legal rules during their negotiation process. I begin by sketching
the agreed legal framework and agreed structure of the negotiation process
that the parties defined prior to the commencement of permanent status
negotiations. I then proceed to analyze the functions served by international
norms during the talks.
124. Press Release, World Council of Churches, Panelists at odds over role of international
law in Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts (Nov. 13, 2003), at http://www2.wcc-
coe.org/pressreleasesen.nsf/index/pu-03-43.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
125. Id.
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A. The "Agreed" Legal Framework
In order to place the legal discourse during permanent status
negotiations in context, it is useful to begin by assessing the extent to which
the parties had agreed upon a legal framework for the talks: Had they reached
an understanding about the zone of lawfulness within which they were
bargaining? Did international legal norms help them to define their reservation
points and the credibility of their counterpart's reservation points? Had they
identified a body of norms that might serve as standards for resolving
differences between them? Had they agreed on an institution or third party
that could use law to fill in gaps in their agreement?
To the extent the parties had defined a legal framework, it was spare:
The Declaration of Principles ("DOP"), 126 the foundational agreement that set
the basic terms for the negotiation process that ensued, refers to only a few
legal parameters. It defines the ultimate aim of the negotiations as follows:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Authority ... for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent
settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole
peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.127
Reflecting the inability of the parties to resolve a longstanding debate
about whether Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 are self-executing or
require further elaboration through negotiations, 128 the DOP simply
incorporates the debate into its terms, providing in one clause that negotiations
were to lead to a permanent settlement "based on" Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338 and, in another, that they would lead "to the
implementation" of those resolutions. 129 The DOP, moreover, does nothing to
articulate a common understanding of Resolution 242, the interpretation of
which would become a major dispute when the parties commenced permanent
• . 130
status negotiations.
126. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Sept. 13, 1993), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 890 [hereinafter DOP].
127. Id. art. I (emphasis added). U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted six months
after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, see QUANDT, supra note 6, at 46, during which Israel seized the
West Bank (then occupied and claimed by Jordan), the Gaza Strip (which was administered by Egypt),
the Sinai Peninsula (Egyptian territory), and the Golan Heights (Syrian territory). In Resolution 242, the
Security Council "emphasiz[ed] the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the region can live in security;" and it called,
inter alia, for the "[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forced from territories occupied" during the war, and the
"[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." S.C. Res. 242,
2 & 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967). In Resolution 338, adopted in October 1973 during the
Yom Kippur War, the Council called, inter alia, for the commencement of negotiations "between the
parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the
Middle East." S.C. Res. 338, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508 (Oct. 22, 1973).
128. See Ross, supra note 6, at 43-44.
129. DOP, supra note 126, at 890.
130. See infra notes 164-166, 180, 191-195 and accompanying text.
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The DOP's few other references to international legal rules are even
more oblique. The document's preamble states that the parties "recognize
their mutual legitimate and political rights. ' 31 It does not, however, elaborate
on the content of those rights or on their bearing on permanent status issues;
and the letters of recognition exchanged by the parties prior to the DOP's
signing provide only limited guidance.1 32 The DOP does define a general
substantive agenda for permanent status negotiations, which is to include
"Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations
and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common interest;"
'' 33
but, with one exception, 134 it does not set out rules or principles to guide
resolution of those issues other than through its references to Resolutions 242
and 338. According to Joel Singer, the legal adviser to the Israeli team that
negotiated the DOP, the agreement's minimal definition of legal parameters
was intentional, reflecting "the principle that all options should be left
open."'
35
This "principle" is also apparent in the DOP provisions defining the
process by which subsequent agreements, including the permanent status
agreement, would be negotiated and disputes about them would be resolved.
The PLO officials who negotiated the DOP sought "to retain the option of
outside arbitration ... to guarantee that the agreement would be fulfilled."
136
The DOP makes clear, however, that all disputes "arising out of the
application or interpretation" of its terms would be resolved, in the first
instance, through negotiations, with recourse to conciliation and arbitration
only with the consent of both parties.' 37 Reference of disputes to arbitration,
moreover, would be limited to "disputes relating to the interim period."'
' 38
Singer writes that this provision was intended to ensure that "[d]isputes
relating to the permanent status agreement shall be resolved only through
negotiations."' 3 Indeed, the DOP leaves little doubt about the approach to
conflict resolution it embodies: As declared in its preamble, the agreement set
131. DOP, preamble, supra note 126, at 890.
132. The PLO recognizes "the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security." Letter
from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of
Israel (Sept. 9, 1993), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 889. Israel, in
turn, recognizes "the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people . . . " Letter from Yitzhak
Rabin to Yasser Arafat (Sept. 9, 1993), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5,
at 889.
133. DOP, art. 5, supra note 126, at 890-91. Agreed minutes appended to the DOP add two
issues to this list: "military locations" and "Israelis." Agreed Minutes, Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government (Sept. 13, 1993), sec. B, art. IV, in id. at 896-97.
134. The one exception appears in an annex to the agreement addressing cooperation in
economic and development programs. It provides, "Cooperation in the field of water ... will include
proposals for studies and plans ... on equitable utilization ofjoint water resources for implementation
in and beyond the interim period." DOP, Annex 3, supra note 126, at 894-95 (emphasis added). This
reference to the norm of equitable utilization would also be a focus of dispute during permanent status
negotiations between the parties.
135. Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements:
Some Legal Aspects, JUST., Winter 1994, at 13.
136. URI SAVIR, THE PROCESS: 1,100 DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (1998).
137. DOP, art. 15, supra note 126, at 892-93.
138. Id.
139. Singer, supra note 135, at 6.
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the parties on a path toward peace and reconciliation "through the agreed
political process"-not through a legal process imposed by others.
140
A broad cross-section of the international community undertook on
various occasions to articulate additional parameters to guide the Palestinian-
Israeli peace process. The United Nations General Assembly, for example,
passed a series of resolutions during the decade before the commencement of
permanent status negotiations that defined "principles for the achievement of
comprehensive peace," including:
(a) The withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including
Jerusalem, and from the other occupied Arab territories;
(b) Guaranteeing arrangements for security of all States in the region, including those
named in resolution 181 (I1) of 29 November 1947, within secure and internationally
recognized boundaries;
(c) Resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with General Assembly
resolution 194 (111) of 11 December 1948, and subsequent relevant resolutions;
(d) Dismantling the Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967;
(e) Guaranteeing freedom of access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites.141
Although resolutions of this kind received broad support within the
General Assembly, Israel and the United States declined to sign on to them.
142
Indeed, the United States made clear in a letter of assurances to the
Palestinians in the run-up to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 that, so
long as negotiations between the parties were underway, it would not support
"a competing or parallel process" in the United Nations. 143 The U.S.
maintained this position throughout the Oslo process.144 In September 1999,
140. DOP, preamble, supra note 126, at 890 (emphasis added).
141. G.A. Res. 44/42, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/42 (Dec. 6, 1989); see also G.A. Res. 45/68, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/45/68 (Dec. 6, 1990). U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (ili), to which the cited
resolutions refer, provides that Palestinian refugees "wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so ... and that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return . G.A. Res. 194 (I11), at 24, U.N. Doc. A/194 (Dec. 11,
1948).
142. The 1989 and 1990 resolutions received nearly universal support, with only Israel, the
United States, and Dominica voting against them. Support for these resolutions among European states
and the U.S.S.R. trailed off in 1991, however, after the convocation of the Madrid Peace Conference.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/75 (Dec. 11, 1991). From 1993 to 1995, the text of this series of resolutions was
altered, expressing support for the peace process then underway, while omitting the references to the
guiding principles expressed earlier. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/75, U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/75 (Dec. 11,
1993). This formulation won the support of Israel and the United States. Resolutions reintroducing the
principles (though omitting the reference to dismantling settlements) were again passed with broad
support from 1997 through 1999, but these again were opposed by Israel and the United States. See, e.g.,
G.A. Res. 52/52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/52 (Dec. 9, 1997).
143. Letter from James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, to Palestinians (Oct. 18, 1991), in 2
DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 881, 882.
144. For example, although President Clinton reassured Chairman Arafat in April 1999 that the
United States "knows how destructive settlement activities ... are to the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli
peace" and "will continue to exert maximum efforts to have both parties avoid unilateral steps or actions
designed to change the status of the West Bank or Gaza or to prejudge or preempt issues reserved for
permanent status negotiations," Letter from Bill Clinton, President, United States of America, to Yasser
Arafat, President, Palestinian Authority (Apr. 26, 1999), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1145, the Clinton Administration declined even to allow censure of
settlement activity in the Security Council, vetoing two resolutions that called on Israel to halt
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shortly before the commencement of permanent status negotiations, the
European Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Chairman Arafat
reaffirming "the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-
determination including the option of a state," and appealing to the parties "to
strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing
agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any
veto." 145 Although the U.S. Secretary of State also conveyed a letter of
assurances to the Palestinians in September 1999, the U.S. letter did not speak
of an "unqualified" right to self-determination--or of legal rights and
obligations at all. Secretary Albright did express concern about ongoing Israeli
settlement activity, but her concerns were framed not in terms of the illegality
of settlement construction but, rather, of its effect on the political environment
within which negotiations were taking place.' 46 Indeed, as it had emphasized
in its 1991 letter of assurances to the Palestinians, which stated that it would
"accept any outcome agreed by the parties," the U.S. government showed
little inclination to recognize any legal constraint on the outcome of the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process-other than the necessity that the outcome
be negotiated.
147
In sum, the parties entered permanent status negotiations in 1999
without first having agreed on a clear set of legal principles to guide their
talks. Not only had they defined a legal framework of extremely limited scope
(just how limited would become clear on the eve of the negotiations), they
also had failed to establish any mechanisms-or to agree on any institutions-
that could elaborate on it. And the third party that had assumed the lead role in
mediating the peace process, the United States, expressed unwillingness to
constrain the substantive direction of the talks through parallel action in the
United Nations or pronouncements of its own understanding of applicable
legal norms. The cumulative effect of these decisions was that a number of
questions with important implications for the parties' negotiating positions
and strategies remained unresolved upon the commencement of negotiations:
Did any mandatory rules of international law narrow the range of negotiated
outcomes the parties could reach? Did the parties share a bargaining zone-
i.e., was there any overlap between the minimum each would accept? Which
criteria, legal or otherwise, would be used to evaluate competing preferences?
What principles or bodies of law could be used to fill in the unavoidable gaps
construction of the settlement of Har Homa near Jerusalem. See Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Again Fails to Adopt Resolution on Israeli Settlement, U.N. Doc. SC/6345 (Mar. 21,
1997). The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, explained the U.S. position during
discussion of a similar resolution in the General Assembly, stating, "we must take great care to respond
to developments in a constructive way that will bolster the negotiating process, not limit prospects for
the successful conclusion of permanent status talks. We have never believed, despite the useful role the
United Nations can play and has played in working for Middle East peace, that it is an appropriate forum
for addressing the issues now under negotiation between the parties." U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 93d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.93 (Mar. 13, 1997).
145. Letter from Taria Halonen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gov't of Finland, to Yasser
Arafat, President, Palestinian Authority (Sept. 4, 1999) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
146. See SWISHER, supra note 6, at 152.
147. For example, in a letter from President Clinton to Chairman Arafat in May 1999, Clinton
asks Arafat to "continue to rely on the peace process as the way to fulfill the aspirations of your people,"
adding that "negotiations are the only realistic way to fulfill those aspirations . ENDERLIN, supra
note 6, at 108.
2007]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32: 61
in an agreement? And what institutions or mechanisms could be employed to
undertake that process of gap filling after the conclusion of an agreement? As
will be seen, most of these questions remained unresolved through the
duration of the negotiation process.
B. The Agreed Structure of the Negotiation Process
In the DOP, Israel and the PLO resolved to begin permanent status
negotiations "as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third
year of the interim period," 4 8-i.e., in 1996.149 Although a ceremonial session
was held in May 1996, negotiations were suspended immediately thereafter,
following the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel that
June. Three years later, when Ehud Barak assumed office after decisively
defeating Netanyahu, Israeli, Palestinian, and American peace advocates
anticipated a prompt resumption-and resolution---of peace talks. 150 At a
summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh in September 1999, this
optimism found expression in an ambitious timetable for the negotiations. The
parties agreed to "make a determined effort" to negotiate a permanent status
agreement in two phases: First, they would conclude "a Framework
Agreement on all Permanent Status issues" ("FAPS") within five months;
151
they would then conclude a comprehensive agreement ("CAPS") seven
months later.152 As discussed below, the vagueness of the parties' agreed legal
framework placed severe pressure on their capacity to achieve either of these
goals.
The bifurcated process agreed at Sharm--defining a framework of
principles that would be elaborated later in a comprehensive treaty-mirrored
the processes that had led both to Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan
and to its agreements with the PLO within the Oslo framework. 153 These two
sets of precedents, however, pointed in different directions in an important
respect. The Camp David Accords of 1978, and the Israel-Jordan Common
Agenda of 1993, not only invoked U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as
the basis for the treaties the parties were preparing to negotiate, but also
clarified the parties' common understanding of the resolution: essentially, that
Egypt and Jordan, respectively, would resume the exercise of full sovereignty
up to their internationally recognized borders with Palestine' 54 and that the
parties would establish relations normal to states at peace. 155 The Camp David
148. DOP, art. 5(1), supra note 126, at 890-91.
149. By the terms of the agreement, the interim period commenced upon Israel's withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip, id., which took place in May 1994.
150. See ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 109-111; SWISHER, supra note 6, at 13-16.
151. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, para. 1(c), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1149.
152. Id. para. l(d).
153. In both cases, negotiations of a comprehensive treaty commenced after the conclusion of a
framework agreement. See Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt [hereinafter Camp David
Accords] (Sept. 17, 1978), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 865-869;
Common Agenda between Israel and Jordan [hereinafter Common Agenda] (Sept. 14, 1993), in 2
DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 889-90.
154. Camp David Accords, supra note 153, at 868; Common Agenda, supra note 153, at 889.
155. Camp David Accords, supra note 153, at 869; Common Agenda, supra note 153, at 889.
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Accords also defined in somewhat greater detail the establishment of
demilitarized zones in the Sinai Peninsula' 56 and provided for free passage of
Israeli ships through the Suez Canal "on the basis of the Constantinople
Convention of 1888.' ' 7
Four aspects of these framework agreements bear emphasizing. First,
they are brief documents, outlining in spare terms the principles that would
guide negotiations over more comprehensive treaties. Second, despite their
brevity, they define a bargaining zone for subsequent talks, at least with
regard to key issues. Third, they incorporate international legal rules by
reference to fill in gaps in the texts, such as provisions of the Constantinople
Convention and international norms defining sovereignty and peaceful
relations. Fourth, they provide detail regarding only the issues on which they
depart from the default that international law would provide, such as the
establishment of demilitarized zones in the Sinai.
In contrast, the DOP not only offered few substantive parameters for the
permanent status negotiations that were to take place some years later,1 58 it
also failed to define clear principles to guide negotiations over arrangements
for the interim period, outlining proposed arrangements in often ambiguous
terms 159 and entirely without reference to international norms. These
ambiguities, which some had hoped would be resolved in good faith by the
parties as their mutual confidence grew, 160 instead resulted in protracted
debates about a number of critical issues and substantial delays in the
negotiation process. 161 They also made it difficult for the parties to assess
whether they actually shared a bargaining zone: Although they had signed an
agreement, the ambiguities in it left unclear whether the parties were actually
in agreement regarding a range of specific issues-and even whether such
agreement was possible.
Which of these models would the FAPS follow? The Palestinian
leadership approached permanent status negotiations with the express
intention of reaching a FAPS modeled on Israel's framework agreements with
Egypt and Jordan, rather than on the DOP. Their popular legitimacy
challenged by the perceived failure of the Oslo accords to deliver
improvements in Palestinians' lives, 162 the leadership sought to effect a
qualitative change in the relationship with Israel that had been established for
the interim period and to emphasize that the Palestinians expected the same
status and treatment as Israel's other neighbors. Accordingly, the Palestinian
position paper on borders and security issues prepared prior to the
commencement of negotiations states that the goal of permanent status
156. Camp David Accords, supra note 153, at 869.
157. Id. at 868.
158. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
159. See Kittrie, supra note 7, at 1100.
160. Id. at 1670.
161. See generally AHARON KLIEMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-
MAKING (1999) (describing various instances of constructive ambiguity in Oslo Accords and disputes
arising from them).
162. See Omar M. Dajani, Surviving Opportunities: Palestinian Negotiating Patterns in Peace
Talks with Israel, in How ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS NEGOTIATE: A CROSS CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF
THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS 39, 56 (Tamara Coffman Wittes ed. 2005).
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negotiations is to implement U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,
explaining that "[t]he essence of implementation is reflected in the complete
withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from the occupied Palestinian
territories, terminating the Israeli security, military and economic control on
the elements of the Palestinian life in some regions, removing all negative
effects resulted from the Israeli occupation."'
163
The day before the first round of permanent status negotiations
commenced, however, Prime Minister Barak articulated a very different
understanding of the implications of Resolution 242. While attending the
International Socialist conference in Paris, Barak announced to reporters that
Resolutions 242 and 338 did not apply to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations,
explaining:
In the case of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, we are talking about states that have
recognized, agreed borders with us. In the past, on that same border there was belligerent
action, the results of which led to Israel holding onto territory. Resolution 242 refers to
these territories. There is no such border on the West Bank.'64
In a later clarification, Barak stated that while Resolution 242 was indeed
applicable to the negotiations, "its context with regard to negotiations with the
Palestinians is different from the context with regard to the other fronts."
'1 65
These statements "created misgivings about Israel's intentions,"'166 provoking
a fiery response from Yasser Arafat, who declared in his own speech, "Our
Palestinian Arab people are still knocking on the door of international legality
.... International legality is pivotal in the search for a just and comprehensive
peace."
, 167
This disagreement about how Resolution 242 applied to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict not only foreshadowed a normative dispute that re-emerged
once negotiations began, it also challenged the logic behind the bifurcated
process and short timetable to which the parties had agreed at Sharm el-
Sheikh. The brief timeframe initially allocated to negotiating the FAPS168 was
based on the expectation that the parties would conclude a relatively brief
agreement--"a thin FAPS," as they called it-that, as its name suggested,
would define the framework for a comprehensive agreement.
In order to conclude a thin FAPS, however, the parties needed either to
agree on principles that were clear and robust enough to establish their
bargaining zone (the Egypt/Jordan model), to rely on good faith in interpreting
more ambiguous formulations (the DOP model), and/or to provide for a third
party mechanism to resolve interpretive differences (as Egypt and Israel had
done to resolve a border dispute about Taba). The public scrape over
163. Palestinian Committee on Borders and Security, A Position and Concept Paper about
Borders and Security in the Final Status Negotiations (October 1999) (on file with PLO Negotiations
Affairs Dep't).
164. Yossi BEILIN, THE PATH TO GENEVA: THE QUEST FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, 1996-
2004 115 (2004).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 115-16.
167. See Jocelyn Noveck, Israeli, Palestinian Leaders Disagree on U.N. Resolutions, AKRON
BEACON, Nov. 10, 1999, at A2.
168. Already brief, the time available for negotiation was shortened by Israel's decision to
focus on negotiating a peace agreement with Syria during the same period.
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Resolution 242 just before negotiations began raised questions about the
parties' ability to agree on clear principles, and the lingering recriminations
about the scope of and compliance with their respective obligations under the
Oslo accords challenged each side's confidence in the other's good faith.
Moreover, Israel had made clear in negotiations regarding interim issues that
it regarded the strictly bilateral structure of the negotiations process as a "red
line" and would not countenance third party involvement. As discussed in
the next section, these obstacles to concluding a thin FAPS ultimately proved
insurmountable. As an Israeli legal adviser commented to me during a break
in one of the early negotiation sessions, "Why is it only clear to the lawyers in
the room that a thin FAPS is impossible? Where you want thin, we want fat,
and where we want thin, you want fat!"
C. Competing Visions of Law's Role in Permanent Status
Negotiations
Once permanent status negotiations eventually began in November
1999, the parties were confronted with a challenge of formidable proportions.
Having committed to "make a determined effort to conclude a Framework
Agreement on all Permanent Status issues" by February 13,2000, 170 their first
deadline loomed only 100 days ahead. Because the parties had reached
agreement upon so little prior to the commencement of talks, however, the
substantive questions they had yet to resolve were numerous, including:
" Would a Palestinian state be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?
" What course would the borders between Israel and the "Palestinian
entity"' 171 take? Would a territorial link between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip be established?
" How would sovereignty and control over the city of Jerusalem be
allocated?
* What would happen to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, East
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip and their residents?
" How would strategic and tactical security arrangements be structured in the
future? Would Israel maintain military/security assets in or access to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and their airspace? Would limitations be placed
on Palestinian military or security capacity?
* What would be the fate of the Palestinian refugees who fled or were
expelled from territory in what is now the State of Israel? Would they be
permitted to return to Israel? What would happen to their real property and
other assets in Israel?
169. See Omar M. Dajani, Understanding Barriers to Peace: A Palestinian Response, 20 NEG.
J. 401,404-05 (2004).
170. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, para. 1(c), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1150.
171. Until May 2000, when Israeli negotiators began to acknowledge that a Palestinian state
would be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the context of a permanent status agreement,
they tended to refer only to the "Palestinian entity" that would be established. See infra note 248 and
accompanying text.
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" How would sovereignty and control over critical resources such as water
and the electromagnetic sphere be allocated and coordinated?
" What kind of economic relationship would the parties establish in the
future? Would the modified customs union established by the Oslo Accords
be replaced by a free trade area?
These questions, in turn, raised a range of difficult process questions:
Which issues should be negotiated first? Which issues should be negotiated in
tandem? Which, if any, were not subject to negotiation at all? Which issues
should be addressed in the FAPS and which in the CAPS? Which should be
addressed in other ways, such as through side agreements, unilateral
declarations, or commitments to third parties? What effect would
commitments in the FAPS have pending negotiation of the CAPS? With
which Palestinian entity would each agreement be concluded-the PLO or the
government of a Palestinian state? In what order would each side perform its
obligations? Would a new set of transitional arrangements be defined? For
what duration? How-and by whom-would disputes regarding interpretation
or implementation of the agreements be resolved?
Presented with such a dizzying agenda and such a short deadline, each of
the parties arrived at the table with ideas about how to simplify the task before
them. Their ideas, however, differed, and one of the issues with respect to
which they differed most was the role that international law should play in
resolving the substantive and procedural questions the parties faced. In his
memoir of the peace process, United States mediator Dennis Ross observes:
Over time, the negotiations that emerged from the Madrid and Oslo processes were very
detailed on all issues. But the points of departure were very different. The Arabs and
Palestinians always sought acceptance of their principles while the Israelis always sought
recognition of the practicalities. The gaps on the issues bore not just disagreements but
very different attitudes about the negotiations, their purpose, and the tactics that should
be employed.1
72
Even if one puts aside Ambassador Ross's implicit judgment about the
reasonableness of the parties' respective approaches ("their principles" vs.
"the practicalities"), I submit that his account misapprehends the core
difference between them. As discussed below, both parties undertook to
confirm that they shared a bargaining zone by seeking agreement to a set of
guiding principles. Both parties also articulated principles on the basis of
which, they argued, prospective deal points should be evaluated. What they
differed about was which principles to use. Whereas the principles urged by
the Palestinians tended to be defined in relation to international legal norms
(at least initially), the principles advanced by the Israelis tended to be defined
in relation to Israel's national security concept, domestic public opinion, and,
toward the end of the negotiation process, American proposals.
In this Section, I undertake to explain those differences by examining
how the parties used, or attempted to use, international law and their discourse
about its value and relevance to their negotiation process. Although it is
difficult to generalize about a process that ultimately spanned thirteen months
172. Ross, supra note 6, at 44-45.
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and scores of meetings among changing teams of negotiators from each side, I
suggest that the parties attempted to use international legal rules during the
negotiations in four different ways: (1) to facilitate definition of either a zone
of lawfulness or a bargaining zone; (2) as objective standards for choosing
between competing positions; (3) to fill in gaps in the agreement; and (4) to
challenge the legitimacy of non-legal criteria for resolving disputed issues.
Each of these patterns is considered below.
1. Use of Legal Rules to Facilitate Zone Definition
During early negotiation rounds in the winter of 1999-2000, the parties
dedicated considerable effort to discussing how to structure an agenda for the
negotiation process-which issues would be addressed and in what order they
would be negotiated. These discussions were sometimes contentious, often
implicating the parties' substantive positions, and they never produced a
lasting decision, the negotiations instead proceeding in an ad hoc manner.
Indeed, debates about the sequence and content of the parties' substantive
agenda persisted until well into June 2000 173-seven months after the
commencement of the talks. To a significant extent, as described below, the
parties' disputes about how and what to negotiate arose from disputes about
guiding principles.
Particularly during early rounds, the Palestinian team argued that
negotiations should begin with an effort to reach a common understanding
regarding the legal principles that would guide resolution of disputed issues.
Their arguments took two forms. Initially, the Palestinian negotiating team
took the position that international norms were mandatory rules that required
resolution of disputed issues in particular ways, declining to discuss Israeli
proposals until the parties reached consensus about the boundaries of the zone
of lawfulness within which they were operating. Over time, however,
Palestinian negotiators began invoking law in a different way, treating
international norms as default rules. While acknowledging that the parties
could depart from the default if they so agreed, the Palestinians turned to
arguing that the rules established certain principles that should serve as a
starting point for negotiations, in essence invoking the "shadow of the law" to
bolster the credibility of their declared reservation points. The Israeli response
to both kinds of arguments was to challenge the applicability and efficacy of
international legal norms, as well as the Palestinians' interpretations of them.
a. Mandatory Rules
The Palestinians' initial approach is well-illustrated by their positions in
early negotiation sessions on refugees, security, and territorial issues. In their
first presentation of their "concept" for resolution of the refugee issue, for
example, they argued that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, which
provides, inter alia, that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and
173. See Minutes, Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations, Boiling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
(June 13, 2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs
Dep't).
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live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so, '' 17 4 simply
"restated and reaffirmed a well-established norm in international customary
law."'175 Accordingly, they submitted, "the Framework Agreement must give
full recognition to the right of every refugee to return to his or her home" and
provide for the implementation of that right. 176 Although the Palestinians'
presentation also cited a range of non-legal justifications for refugee return, 77
the central thrust of their argument was that Palestinian refugees have a
sacrosanct individual legal right to return and that negotiations should be
178confined to defining a process for its realization.
The Palestinians' opening presentation on borders and security issues
also undertook to narrow the scope of negotiations through reference to
mandatory rules. This passage from the speech, a virtual paean to international
law, is illustrative:
We are convinced that the strongest and most durable foundation for peace between us is
international law. In the wake of the Second World War, the international community
united in an effort to prevent that terrible human tragedy from ever occurring again. That
effort yielded two legal instruments that represent the international consensus regarding
how we must conduct ourselves during times of peace and during times of war: the
Charter of the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. To be sure, these
two legal instruments do not provide detailed answers to all of the questions presently
before us .... They do, however, codify many of the principles essential to the orderly
conduct of international relations-principles that must guide both our present
deliberations and our relationship in the future.
Central among these principles is the rule against the acquisition of territory by
threat or use of force. As the United Nations Security Council recognized in Resolution
242, a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is contingent upon faithful application of
that rule. Thus, although we believe that every State in the region is indeed entitled to live
in peace within secure and recognized borders, we also believe that an unjust border can
never be secure. Accordingly, a settlement involving anything less than Israeli
withdrawal to 1967 borders and the realization of the civil, political, and economic rights
of the Palestinian people will serve neither the interests of peace nor the interests of
security. 79
In this presentation, the Palestinians were not simply citing international
norms as evidence of the fairness of their position; they were arguing that
international norms mandated a particular result-i.e., that the "rule against
the acquisition of territory by force" required nothing less than "Israeli
withdrawal to 1967 borders." As Shlomo Ben Ami later recounted, "For the
174. G.A. Res. 194 (11I), 11 U.N. Doc. A/RES/194 (111) (Dec. 11, 1949).
175. Yasser Abed-Rabbo, Palestinian Authority Minister of Culture and Information,
Palestinian Presentation on Refugees at the Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, Neve Ilan
Hotel, Jerusalem (Dec. 9, 1999) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
176. Id.
177. Other justifications offered in the presentation included Israel's moral obligation "to
shoulder the responsibility" for "the creation and perpetuation of the refugee problem over the past fifty
years," the interest in "generating public confidence in peace," and interest in minimizing the threat to
security represented by "keeping a population of refugees by force out of their places of origin." Id.
178. Id. At the conclusion of this presentation, the Israeli negotiating team declined to discuss
the legal basis for refugee return, and the issue of refugees appears not to have been taken up again by
the parties until March 2000. See ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 143 (describing U.S.-moderated
brainstorming session on refugees).
179. General Abdel Razzaq el-Yahya, Chairman of Palestinian Borders and Security
Committee, The Palestinian Vision for Peace and Security, Presentation at the Palestinian-Israeli
Permanent Status Negotiations, Neve Ilan Hotel, Jerusalem (Nov. 29, 1999) (on file with PLO
Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
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Palestinians, this was a simple, clear-cut process of decolonisation based on
'international legitimacy' and 'UN relevant resolutions."" 
80
The Israeli team began from a very different starting point. 18 1 At a
ceremony on September 13, 1999, marking the formal resumption of
permanent status negotiations, Israel's then-Foreign Minister David Levy
announced that "Israel is guided by four basic principles in negotiating a
permanent status agreement: we will not return to the 1967 lines; united
Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel; settlement blocs will remain under
Israeli sovereignty; there will be no foreign army west of the Jordan River."'
' 82
The Israeli negotiating team's proposals during early rounds of negotiations
conformed to these principles. 183 On December 20, 1999, for example, the
Israeli team presented its "concept" for the "land basket" (i.e., issues with a
territorial dimension). 84 Suggesting that "[t]he issue of settlements must be
resolved in a permanent and realistic way-and we emphasize 'realistic,"'
Israel's head of delegation, Ambassador Oded Eran, explained that there were
175,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank 185 and that "[i]t would be unrealistic
to expect that this number will be removed from where they live today."'
186
Accordingly, he proposed, three categories of settlements were envisioned:
those "in blocs under Israeli sovereignty"; "other individual settlements ...
under Israeli sovereignty"; and other settlements "not under Israeli
sovereignty whose status will be negotiated."'' l8 With respect to the individual
settlements to be placed under Israeli sovereignty, Eran stated that "four
principles must be provided for in the agreement: (1) viability and future
development of settlements[;] (2) means of livelihood and necessary
infrastructure[;) (3) safety and security[; and] (4) free and secure movement
and access."' 18 In addition, Eran also proposed that a number of security
zones-some under Israeli sovereignty, some under Israeli control-be
established or maintained in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.'
89
When smaller teams from each side convened the next day to discuss
territorial issues in greater detail, the differences between their approaches
came into sharper focus. According to a report of the meeting prepared by the
PLO's legal unit, the Palestinians continued to argue that international law
mandated Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines: "the Palestinian side emphasized
that international law-specifically, the rule against the acquisition of territory
by force-and the 'land for peace' formula promoted in Resolution 242
180. BEN AMI, supra note 6, at 246.
181. Seeid.at247.
182. David Levy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address at the Ceremony Marking the
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Erez Crossing Point (Sept. 13, 1999).
183. Ross, supra note 6, at 624-25 (describing "the red lines that had governed the Israeli
approach in the negotiations").
184. Ambassador Oded Eran, Presentation at Negotiation Session, Best Eastern Hotel,
Ramallah (Dec. 20, 1999) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO
Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
185. Throughout the negotiations process, the parties disagreed about whether Israeli residents
of East Jerusalem were appropriately considered settlers. Reflecting Israel's position, Eran refers here
only to Israeli settlers outside of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem established by Israel.
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required Israeli withdrawal to the armistice cease-fire lines in force on June 4,
1967." 190 With respect to the Israeli presentation the day before, "[t]he
Palestinian side asked a number of questions intended to probe the legal basis
(or lack thereof) for the Israeli proposals," but the Palestinians declined to
discuss the issues of borders, settlements, and security arrangements in detail
unless "the Israeli side ... agreed to withdrawal."' 191
The Israeli side, as the Palestinians perceived it, "appeared hesitant to
discuss the legal basis for its proposals and sought, throughout the meeting, to
shift the discussion to the concrete proposals they presented at the plenary
session." 192 When pressed to respond to Palestinian questions about the
applicable legal framework, "[t]he Israeli side suggested that international law
can be useful in negotiations only if both sides agree that it is applicable and
agree on its interpretation. They made clear. . . that they did not think there is
agreement regarding either the applicability or the interpretation of
international law in the present negotiations."' 93 According to the Palestinians,
the Israeli team responded to their specific legal arguments as follows:
Resolution 242. The Israeli side argued that 242 simply requires a compromise
between territory and security. They stated that, while the rule against the acquisition of
territory by force was applicable, it was somehow applicable only to a limited extent in
the context of the West Bank/Gaza. What 242 did require, they claimed, was the
establishment, for each State, of "secure and defensible borders". It is unclear to what
extent they regard this requirement as applicable to a state of Palestine, however: they
reiterated that Palestine was not mentioned in 242 and that the [sic] Palestinian
peoplehood had not received international recognition in 1967.
Fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli side refused to acknowledge that the
Convention is applicable, arguing that Israel is not a belligerent occupant. They claimed
that occupation presupposes the prior existence of a State and that "nobody knows" the
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 1967.... Although they acknowledged
that Israel's views on this issue place it in the extreme minority, they asserted that "no
one can force Israel to adopt another interpretation."
Peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli side argued, without
elaboration, that these peace treaties do not provide useful precedents because the factual
contexts were different. 194
In sum, the Israeli team argued that the legal rules cited by the
Palestinians did little to define a zone of lawfulness for the talks: they were
either inapplicable or indeterminate with respect to disposition of the issues on
the table. They also maintained that Israel could not be obliged to accept the
Palestinians' interpretation of norms, even if it was shared by the majority of
the international community. Because legal norms were not "useful," the
parties should resolve their disputes on the basis of other, more "realistic"
grounds.
At virtually the same time that Palestinians and Israelis were debating
these issues around the negotiation table, a very similar discussion unfolded
among delegates to the sixty-eighth plenary meeting of the U.N. General
190. PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't Legal Unit, Report on Permanent Status Negotiations:
Special Session on Borders Issues, December 21, 1999, Ramallah (Dec. 23, 1999) (on file with PLO






Assembly. As in previous years, the General Assembly considered a battery of
draft resolutions relating to the question of Palestine. 195 In one of these
resolutions, entitled "Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine," the
General Assembly noted "with satisfaction . . . the commencement of the
negotiations on the final settlement," 196 and emphasized the need for:
"realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the
right to self-determination;" 197 "withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967; '' 198 and "resolving the problem of the Palestine
refugees in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) of December 1948."'99
The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority (149 votes to
3, with 2 abstentions), but the delegates' explanations for their votes are more
illuminating than the final tally. The Palestinian and Israeli delegates,
unsurprisingly, expressed very different views about the appropriate role for
the international community in their negotiations. The Israeli delegate
reaffirmed Israel's insistence on the strict bilateralism of the peace talks,
explaining that Israel had chosen to vote against the resolution because it
"openly seeks to predetermine the issues to be resolved by ... negotiations,
even as Israel and the Palestinians commit themselves to the permanent status
talks that are now under way." 20 0 He argued, moreover, that a bilateral
201approach was explicitly mandated by the parties' earlier agreements. The
Palestinian delegate, in contrast, argued for a robust international role in
ensuring that the talks were guided by international legal norms. He stated that
the broad support for the resolution reflected "the commitment by the
international community . . . to continue the efforts that we made to attain
peace on the basis of international law and the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations," expressing hope "that the Israeli side will abandon its
present policy and positions and will start complying with requirements of
international legitimacy" and calling on the international community "to take
the necessary steps to end [Israel's] misguided conduct. 20 2
The other delegates' speeches addressed the role of international law-
and of the international community-in constraining the outcome of the peace
talks in a number of different ways. A first group, comprised of
representatives of Arab and Muslim countries and the Islamic Conference,
spoke in the language of mandatory rules. Indonesia's delegate, for example,
asserted that "everlasting peace can be established only with the full and
unfettered exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and the
complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab lands," and that "[t]he
United Nations continues to bear a historical and moral responsibility for
195. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.




200. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.68 (Dec. 1, 1999).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 20.
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resolving this intractable conflict in all its aspects. ' 2°3 A second group, which
included the delegates of Chile and Argentina, expressed support for strict
application of international norms and UN resolutions to the resolution of the
issues in dispute, but stopped short either of explaining what result that
mandated or of demanding an international role in assuring it.20 4 The Republic
of Korea expressed support for the principles embraced by the resolution but
seemed to suggest that the international community should focus on
"endeavour[ing] to create the most propitious environment for peace to be
realized" by facilitating Palestinian economic development. 20 5 The European
Union simply "reiterate[d] its firm commitment to a just, lasting and
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East based on the Madrid and Oslo
Accords," leaving the support of its members for the resolution to speak for
itself. 206 Finally, the United States, which joined Israel (and the Marshall
Islands) in voting against the resolution, lent its support to Israel's bilateralist
position, arguing that "[b]y adopting this... resolution, the General Assembly
would seek to inappropriately interject its views into these negotiations,"
which "complicate[s] ... the efforts of the parties themselves to achieve a
settlement."207
It is risky to extrapolate too much about states' attitudes regarding the
role of international law in peace negotiations from votes on resolutions of
this kind and the speeches explaining them. The legal effect of General
Assembly resolutions in general is a matter of some contention. 20 And when
a resolution presumes to apply international law to a specific conflict, it is
particularly hard to distinguish a commitment to a given norm from an effort
to advance a narrower political agenda (e.g., supporting an ally, seeking a
precedent that will advance a government's own interests in a separate (or
related) context, or satisfying domestic constituencies with brave words in a
setting that presents few costs). Moreover, the speeches offered in support of
Resolution 54/42 express so many different rationales at such varying levels
of abstraction that a prevailing "international community" position regarding
the legal parameters-the zone of lawfulness-for a Palestinian-Israeli peace
settlement is difficult to discern.
209
What the discourse in the General Assembly in December 1999 does
illustrate, however, is the challenges Palestinians were likely to face if they
sought third-party adjudication or enforcement of the legal norms they were
invoking at the negotiating table. Notwithstanding the near universal
expression of support for their positions on key issues, the United States's
opposition to even a limited normative statement by the international
203. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This position was also taken by the delegates from Lebanon, id.
at 4; Oman, id. at 5; the Syrian Arab Republic, id. at 6-7; Qatar, id. at 10; and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, id. at 11.
204. Id. at I (Chile); id. at 9 (Argentina).
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 13-14.
207. Id. at 16.
208. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 207-211
(2002) (describing various theories regarding the General Assembly's law-making powers).
209. That said, the resolution arguably goes a good distance toward defining a prevailing
international conception of the appropriate political contours of a peace settlement.
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community did not bode well for the Palestinians' argument that the contours
of a final settlement were constrained by mandatory rules of international law.
Indeed, it foreshadowed the position that United States officials would take at
Camp David a few months later.
For a time, however, the normative debate ended there. In January 2000,
the parties shifted to negotiating the scope of still unfulfilled interim
commitments, 210 and the Barak government focused its attention on
negotiating a peace agreement with Syria.2 11 The February 13, 2000, deadline
for concluding the FAPS passed without fanfare-and without an agreement.
b. Default Rules
During the spring and summer of 2000, Palestinian negotiators began to
change the way they used international law in negotiations. They continued to
seek Israeli acknowledgement that international legal rules entitled the
Palestinian people to certain benefits, but they expressed increasing
willingness to exchange those benefits for others--essentially, to bargain in
the shadow of the law.
This shift in approach first appeared during a round of "back channel"
talks convened in late April and early May 2000 in Jerusalem and Stockholm
as part of an effort to jump-start the moribund Palestinian-Israeli track.212
During these talks, Palestinian negotiators for the first time "acknowledged
that settlement areas like Gush Etzion, Ramot, and Gilo could become part of
Israel given either their contiguity or their significance in terms of historical
Jewish presence[,],, 213 but they continued to state that they "preferred to build
the map from concepts rather than to build the concepts from the map. 21 4
These concepts included recognition of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by war and the obligation of states to conduct themselves in
conformity with the U.N. Charter and the norms of international law, and the
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination," norms the Palestinians
sought to reference explicitly in the agreement.
215
The Palestinian negotiators involved in the Stockholm round disclaimed
their concessions when their talks were leaked to the public, 216 and Mahmoud
Abbas, then head of the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department, made
clear that Palestinians "could only accept the full implementation of the U.N.
210. In the parties' earlier agreements, Israel had committed to undertake a series of
redeployments from West Bank territory (territory over which the Palestinian Authority would assume
jurisdiction), the last two of which had yet to be completed. The scale of these redeployments, along
with other issues, was the focus of negotiation during this period. See ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 138-
40; see also Ross, supra note 6, at 591-99.
211. See ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 140-42.
212. These talks were held in secret, with the knowledge only of the participants and their
principals, at the same time that "front channel" talks proceeded in the Israeli resort town of Eilat. For a
detailed description of the Stockholm round, see Ross, supra note 6, at 603-620; ENDERLIN, supra note
6, at 147-158.
213. Ross, supra note 6, at 614.
214. Id.
215. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 154.
216. Id. at 158 (noting that Palestinian negotiator Ahmad Qurei' described the Stockholm paper
as an "Israeli document").
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resolutions now-on both territory and refugees." 217 Nevertheless, the
Palestinians reverted to the approach they had taken at Stockholm when they
arrived at Camp David two months later. The following exchange regarding
territorial issues on July 12, 2000, the second day of the summit, illustrates
this shift:
Abu Ala [Ahmad Qurei]: Will you accept the June 4 border [as the basis of
discussion]? Will you accept the principle of the exchange of territories?
Shlomo Ben Ami: The Palestinian State will be created in the context of the
agreement. This will be the solution to the refugee and Jerusalem problems. It will create
a new situation, including various elements [that could play a role in the] exchange of
territories.
Mohammed Dahlan (with Saeb Erekat translating from Arabic to English): We're
entering the final week of a negotiation that has lasted five years. I know time isn't on our
side. Will you accept Abu Ala's position on the subject of the line of June 4, 1967? We
don't trust the way the Israelis are approaching the negotiation. You demand positions in
Palestinian territory, we accept, and when all is said and done we wind up as strangers in
this territory. We know what you want, but I don't think we can go further if you don't
recognize the June 4 line. After that, it will be possible to discuss modifications of the
border and raise the question of the settlements. But this can't be done unless there's an
agreement on the '67 line and [recognition oJ] the concept of an exchange of territories.
Ben Ami: We'll see that on the maps. But we've always taken the '67 line as a
basis. The percentages of territory [that must be evacuated by the Israeli army] in the
framework of the interim accord are on the West Bank, that is, on the basis of the '67
line.
Dahlan: We're claiming the '67 line as a reality; it's not just a slogan for us. I
reject on principle any agreement that will then be torpedoed in its implementation.
Madeleine Albright: The Palestinians aren't clearly explaining their demands in
the negotiation, and that makes the Israelis' task difficult. There has to be more depth in
the presentation of your demands .
2
1
Although the Palestinian negotiators in this exchange were not explicitly
using the language of law, their statements treated the June 4, 1967 line not as
a physical fact but as a legal construct. By seeking recognition of the 1967
line as the basis for negotiation, they were in effect claiming legal entitlement
to the West Bank. Unlike in their early presentations, however, the Palestinian
negotiators expressed willingness at Camp David to "discuss modifications of
the border and raise the question of settlements," on the condition that they
would receive compensation in the form of land exchange for any negotiated
modifications to the 1967 line. Thus, they ceased to present Israeli withdrawal
to the 1967 line as a mandatory rule that could not be varied, treating it instead
as the default provided by law-a default that could be bargained around if
commensurate benefits were offered.
The Palestinians' approach appears to have represented an attempt both
to establish a "bargaining endowment"-i.e., to invoke the shadow of the law
to bolster the credibility of their claimed reservation point (establishing a
Palestinian state on territory equivalent in size to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip)-and to narrow the range of outcomes that could emerge from the
negotiations, to obtain reassurance that there was a bargaining zone within
which a deal acceptable to them could be reached. Colonel Dahlan's
expression of concern that a lack of recognition of the 1967 line as a basis for
217. Ross, supra note 6, at 624.
218. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 185 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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negotiation would yield an agreement that would leave the Palestinians
"strangers in the territory" and could be "torpedoed in implementation" was a
direct reference to the DOP and other interim agreements, which left Israel
wide latitude in determining how much territory Palestinians would control
during the interim period.219 The Palestinians' demand for recognition of their
entitlement to the 1967 line at the beginning of the summit seems to have been
an attempt to ensure that permanent status talks would not proceed along the
same path.
At Camp David, however, the Palestinians' attempt to make
international norms the starting point for bargaining encountered resistance
not only from the Israeli team, 22 but also from the Americans, as reflected in
Secretary Albright's intervention during the initial round of territory
negotiations at Camp David. 22 American impatience grew even more
pronounced as the summit progressed (or failed to). On July 15, when asked
by President Clinton to comment on a map presented by the Israelis,
Palestinian negotiator Ahmad Qurei' refused, stating, "The Israelis must first
accept the principle of the exchange of territories. Besides, for the
Palestinians, international legitimacy means Israeli retreat to the border of
June 4, 1967." Clinton's response reportedly was explosive; he shouted, "Sir,
I know you'd like the whole map to be yellow [sovereign Palestinian
territory]. But that's not possible. This isn't the Security Council here. This
isn't the UN General Assembly. If you want to give a lecture, go over there
and don't make me waste my time. . . .You're obstructing the negotiation.
You're not acting in good faith. 222 In an attempt to clarify their position, the
Palestinians conveyed a letter to Clinton the next day, explaining, "The aim of
the negotiations is the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 ... that is,
Israel's withdrawal to the line of June 4, 1967. We are willing to accept
adjustments of the border between the two countries, on condition that they be
equivalent in value and importance." 223 According to then-National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger, the ensuing discussion between Clinton and Arafat
was "very difficult," Clinton threatening to bring an early end to the summit
unless the Palestinians responded to Israel's demands for annexation of
settlement blocs containing 80% of Israeli settlers, for an Israeli military
presence on the West Bank border with Jordan, and a stipulation that the
FAPS would "signify the end of the conflict."
224
The Palestinians' legal arguments did not fall entirely on deaf ears.
Describing internal deliberations regarding the formulation of an American
proposal on territory in September 2000, Dennis Ross writes:
Aaron [Miller] was always arguing for a just and fair proposal. I was not against a fair
proposal. But I felt that the very concept of "fairness" was, by definition, subjective.
219. See Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of
Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 61-66 (1997).
220. Israelis continued to argue that discussion should focus on the arrangements to be put in
place, not on legal rights. See, e.g., ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 201-03.
221. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
222. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 202; see also Ross, supra note 6, at 668-69 (describing same
episode).
223. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 212.
224. ld. at 212-13.
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Similarly, both Rob [Malley] and Gamal [Hilal] believed that the Palestinians were
entitled to 100 percent of the territory. Swaps should thus be equal. They believed this
was a Palestinian right. Aaron tended to agree with them not on the basis of right, but on
the basis that every other Arab negotiating partner had gotten 100 percent. Why should
the Palestinians be different?
I disagreed. I was focused not on reconciling rights but on addressing needs. In
negotiations, one side's principle or "right" is usually the other side's impossibility. Of
course, there are irreducible rights. I wanted to address what each side needed, not what
they wanted and not what they felt they were entitled to.
225
But while the Palestinians' invocation of legal rights at Camp David does
appear to have persuaded some members of the American peace team, Ross's
perspective ultimately prevailed, the U.S. government expressing no explicit
position on the parties' legal rights during the remainder of the negotiation
process.
Even so, the Palestinians attempted to obtain agreement on legal rules as
guiding principles with respect to other issues as well. In negotiations
regarding water, conducted over a number of sessions during the summer of
2000, similar dynamics emerged. At the opening session on water on June 26,
2000, the Palestinians began by presenting a list of principles "under which
we would like to negotiate." 226 These principles included, inter alia, "the
principle of equality between States," "[s]overeignty over unshared
watercourses," and "[e]quitable utilization of international watercourses."
227
In response, the lead Israeli negotiator on water issues stated, "As for
underlying principles: our approach should be pragmatic and practical, '228 and
argued, inter alia, that the agreement should be based "on existing water uses
in existing aquifers and the development of new water sources, primarily
through desalination." 229 After the Israeli presentation, the Palestinian team
insisted that negotiations not go forward until the parties had reached
agreement on guiding principles, and the following exchange ensued:
Dr. Erekat: Before that [sic][discussing quantities to be allocated], we need to
establish principles.
Amb. Eran: We cannot have an answer to your question in isolation from the rest
of the picture.
Dr. Erekat: A working relationship must be based on the principle of equality.
Separatism and pragmatism do not work. We say, "Be fair to us." Once you establish this
principle, only at that point can we talk about joint needs.
Amb. Eran: If I may add my own statement, the angle from which we are coming
is that we do not doubt that you will have sovereignty over your resources.
This is not the issue. Since we are dealing with present needs and future needs, if we are
going to apply the principles of sovereignty, then we can harm ourselves.
Dr. Erekat: We are a nation state, our needs do not mean a disregard of the other
party.
Amb. Eran: I want to [sic] the experts to sit down together, and I want to give
them a time limit, then ask them to come back to us next time, with whatever they have.
225. Ross, supra note 6, at 726 (emphasis added). Ross does not explain which rights, in his
view, are "irreducible" or on what basis the needs of the parties should be objectively assessed.
226. Minutes, State-to-State Relations Committee, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, Jerusalem (June 26,





We need them to put their agreement into writing, with I's and P's [designating
differences in position].
Dr. Erekat: Why start with this approach without agreeing on the principles?
Amb. Eran: I am not willing to accept a principle without knowing what the
implications are. I suggest that we let them sit with the principles and translate into a
document. I don't want to trap them.
Dr. Sharif: Mr. Noah [Kinnarti, Israeli water negotiator] has repeated pragmatism
many times. There is no separation between pragmatism and ideology. The pragmatism is
in the implementation.
Amb.Eran: You cannot drink ideology.
230
This exchange during the first round of water talks shows that, in this context
as well, the Palestinian team sought Israeli acceptance of guiding legal
principles-equality of states, sovereignty over endogenous watercourses,
equitable utilization of shared watercourses-before it would agree to discuss
specific allocations. Although the Israeli team acknowledged that Palestinians
would possess sovereign rights to water resources, it expressed doubts about
both the determinacy of the rules cited by Palestinians ("I am not willing to
accept a principle without knowing what the implications are") and the
efficacy of the rules as standards ("if we are going to apply the principles of
sovereignty, then we can harm ourselves").
At the next session on water, held in Emmitsburg, Maryland, concurrent
with the Camp David summit, the Israeli team again urged that discussion
focus on the quantities of water the Palestinians sought to be allocated in the
future.231 The Palestinians again responded that "at that point in time, it was
more important to agree on principles than on quantities," but they acquiesced
and gave a presentation regarding their projected needs. 232 The Israeli offer
made in response to this presentation, however, was "seen as woefully
inadequate ' 233 and prompted the Palestinian legal adviser in attendance to
write to Sa'eb Ereikat, who headed the committee overseeing talks on future
bilateral relations, complaining, "[T]he Israelis are negotiating in bad faith.
They promised us that they would negotiate on the basis of relations between
two sovereign states, but what they are proposing in many areas is a
continuation of the interim agreement."
2 34
When the parties resumed water talks in Jerusalem a few weeks later, the
Palestinians demanded that legal advisers from each side meet to discuss the
legal framework for the negotiations, and, after again expressing doubts about
the value of such discourse, the Israeli team agreed. 235 During the next
meeting, the Palestinians elaborated upon the legal framework that, they
argued, governed resolution of water issues. They concluded their
presentation by stating, "There is no difference between being practical and
230. Id.
231. Memorandum from Gamal Abouali, PLO Legal Adviser, to Palestinian Water Auth. &
Negotiations Affairs Dep't (July 18, 2000) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Memorandum from Gamal Abouali, PLO Legal Adviser, to Sa'eb Ereikat, Head,
Palestinian Side, Monitoring and Steering Comm. (July 18, 2000) (on file with PLO Negotiations
Affairs Dep't).
235. Minutes, Water Comm. (Under State-to-State Relations Comm.), Neve llan (Aug. 20,
2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
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following [international law]. It is a recognition of the development of the
law, practice, uses, etc. We do not think that it shouldn't be applied to the
Palestine-Israel situation." 236 What then proceeded was one of the few
instances of explicit discourse between the parties about the role and
relevance of international law to the talks between them. Once again, the
Israeli team challenged the determinacy of the norms cited by the Palestinians,
observing that, "The principle of sovereignty underwent a lot of changes in
the past 50 years. No one knows how to define it anymore." The Israeli team
argued that the principle of equitable utilization of international watercourses,
on which the Palestinians sought to base water allocations, had not yet
achieved the status of binding customary law.23 7 In addition, the Israeli legal
adviser challenged the utility of legal norms as a basis for resolving the issues
under consideration, declaring at the conclusion of his presentation that
"international law is vague, not pragmatic, and unrealistic-but that is our
position.
' 238
Ultimately, the parties were unable to agree on a set of guiding
principles for resolution of the issues in dispute. As described above, Israelis
rejected Palestinian attempts to obtain their acceptance of certain legal norms
as parameters for the talks, a position supported by the United States. And, as
described in Section 4, below, Palestinians were unwilling to accept non-legal
guiding principles offered by Israel and the United States. Indeed, the parties'
inability even at the end of the talks to come to a common understanding
regarding the principles that should guide their negotiations raised questions
on both sides about whether they shared a bargaining zone at all.
2. Use of Legal Rules as Objective Standards
The American response to the Palestinian legal arguments in the first
days of the Camp David summit did not prompt them to cease invoking
international law entirely. But the normative debate shifted from the
beginning of the discussion to the middle of it: Palestinian negotiators for the
most part stopped insisting that the Israeli team recognize Palestinian legal
rights as a pre-condition for negotiation, but they continued to cite legal norms
in support of their arguments for particular outcomes. For example, in two
sessions on security issues in September 2000, the parties debated whether
Israel or Palestine would control the Palestinian electromagnetic sphere. In his
opening presentation, Israeli negotiator Gilead Sher stated, "we're not
interested in any commercial use of the sphere. And whatever needs you may
have in it, we shall do our best to accommodate-before signing the
agreement. ' 239 When Palestinian negotiator Mohammad Dahlan responded to
Sher the next day, he expressed willingness to construct a cooperative
236. Minutes, Water Comm. (Under State-to-State Relations Comm.), Neve Ilan (Aug. 24,
2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Minutes, Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, King David Hotel, Jerusalem
(Sept. 17, 2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs
Dep't).
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framework for managing the electromagnetic sphere but rejected Israeli
control on legal grounds:
Regarding the [electromagnetic sphere], you use a phrase which I don't like-that you'll
take care of my commercial needs. I'm talking about my rights. Give me your security
concerns, and let's discuss it. The [electromagnetic] sphere . . . will be under our
sovereignty and control.... Let the technical experts of both sides deal with these issues
in coordination.
240
Palestinians took the same approach to addressing control over airspace: while
recognizing that there would be a need for close coordination between
Palestinian and Israeli air traffic controllers, they rejected the Israeli demand
for overriding control over Palestinian airspace, arguing that "it is Palestinian
by right, and we will accommodate Israeli needs, not the other way
around."' 241 Similarly, in the last meeting between the parties and the
American peace team before the outbreak of the intifada, Palestinian
negotiators, who had earlier expressed willingness to accept Israeli annexation
of certain areas of East Jerusalem, 242 argued that contiguity between
Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem should trump contiguity between Israeli
areas, stating, "the starting point should be that East Jerusalem is under
Palestinian sovereignty and is Palestinian by right."
243
3. Use of Legal Rules as Gap-Fillers
As described above, the bifurcated structure of the permanent status
negotiation process was based on the expectation that the parties would
conclude a relatively brief framework agreement-a "thin FAPS." As the
negotiations proceeded, however, the parties came to recognize the need for a• • 244
far more detailed agreement than was originally envisaged. The need for
detail arose from the parties' inability to agree on guiding principles: the
Israelis had declined to embrace the legal norms urged by the Palestinians;
245
and the Palestinians were unwilling to accept principles that gave Israel wide
discretion in defining the scale of its commitments.
2 6
To a limited extent, however, the parties did use legal rules as gap-
fillers. The issue of Palestinian sovereignty is illustrative. In the first months
of permanent status negotiations, the Israeli negotiating team declined
officially to acknowledge that a Palestinian state would be established in the
context of a permanent status agreement. Until May 2000, they insisted on
referring to the "Palestinian entity (PE)" that would emerge, instead of a
240. Minutes, Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, King David Hotel, Jerusalem
(Sept. 18, 2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs
Dep't).
241. inutes, Consultations with United States Officials, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 2000)
(transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
242. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 269-70.
243. Minutes, Consultations with United States Officials, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 2000)
(transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
244. See Ross, supra note 6, at 616-18 (describing Israeli support for a "fat FAPS" and
Palestinian insistence on "clear" agreement with "no ambiguity").
245. See supra Subsection ill.C.l.b.
246. See Ross, supra note 6, at 616.
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Palestinian state; 247 and they undertook to define the rights and obligations of
this "entity" from the ground up. For example, an Israeli outline of the
structure of a permanent status agreement, presented at talks in Eilat in early
May 2000, included headings such as "Foreign relations of the PE,"
"Territorial regime of areas under PE control and other areas," and "Israelis-
Movement." 248 Thus, in the same way that the Oslo Accords had defined the
powers delegated by Israel to the Palestinian Authority, 249 the Israelis' initial
proposals for a permanent status agreement would have regulated the capacity
of the "PE" to engage in foreign relations, its functional jurisdiction in various
areas of the West Bank, and its personal jurisdiction over Israeli residents of
settlements deep in Palestinian territory.
The parties' discourse changed, however, after Israelis began negotiating
from the express assumption that the Palestinians would establish a state in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.250 A number of the rights attached to statehood
ceased to be topics of negotiation, such as Palestine's power to conduct
foreign relations, its jurisdiction over all persons within Palestinian territory,
and its right to control endogenous watercourses. Rather than defining the
Palestinian state's powers from the ground up, the discussion shifted to
reaching agreement on the specific derogations from sovereignty sought by
the Israelis: assurance that Palestine would not enter into military or security
alliances with states hostile to Israel; provision for Israeli military access to
Palestinian territory in the event of an emergency; acceptance of monitoring
of movement of persons and goods across Palestine's borders for a transitional
period; and permission for Israel to apprehend unidentified and/or hostile
aircraft approaching the two states and to conduct training exercises in
Palestinian airspace. To be sure, some of the derogations sought by the Israelis
were substantial, and Palestinians expressed concern that the exceptions
would swallow the rule, constraining their sovereignty in ways that would
challenge the economic or political viability of their new state. 251 It bears
emphasizing, however, that the parties' point of departure had changed. By
agreeing that the "Palestinian entity" would be a state, the "submerged"
norms 22 of international law that define the rights and duties of states
operated as both default rules and as gap-fillers, narrowing the scope of
bargaining and helping to frame trade-offs. 3
247. During a negotiation round in Eilat, Israel, in late April 2000, Palestinian and Israeli legal
advisers met in an effort to define a "structure" for the FAPS. Even at this time, five months after
negotiations commenced, the draft presented by the Israeli side referred to "The Palestinian Entity
(PE)," not to a Palestinian state. Daniel Reisner, Israeli Legal Adviser, Draft FAPS Structure (Boiling 11
round) (Apr. 29, 2000) (presentation to Ghaith al-Omari, PLO Legal Adviser) (on file with PLO
Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
248. Id.
249. See Dajani, supra note 219, at 61-69.
250. See Ross, supra note 6, at 609 (describing meeting at which Israeli negotiators "conceded
statehood as a principle").
251. See Official Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters (and Letter to the
International Community) (Jan. 1, 2001), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note
5, at 1162-67.
252. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 21.
253. For example, in return for Palestinian consent to Israeli military access to Palestinian
airspace, Israeli negotiators offered to make Palestine "the only sovereign state in the world that will
have a specific, particular, privileged air corridor for your needs through Israeli skies." Minutes,
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4. Challenges to Non-Legal Standards
In addition to urging that principles of international law guide the
negotiations and serve as standards for choosing between competing positions,
Palestinian negotiators used legal rules to challenge the legitimacy of non-
legal standards proposed by Israeli negotiators and American officials for
resolving disputed issues. As described above, Palestinians raised questions
about the legal basis of the principles urged by Israelis from the outset of the• • 254
negotiations. When three of the four principles articulated by David Levy in
September 1999 were incorporated into the "ideas" suggested by President
Clinton in December 2000,255 moreover, Palestinians undertook to challenge
the Clinton ideas on both legal and non-legal grounds.
During the last rounds of negotiations in January 2001, the Israeli team
invoked the principles outlined by Clinton in much the same way that the
Palestinians had invoked international legal norms in earlier negotiation
sessions. At the Taba talks, for example, the Israeli team challenged the
"basis" of Palestinian proposals for border modifications, arguing that they
were inconsistent with Clinton's proposal that Israel annex 4-6% of West
Bank territory, including 80% of the settlers in blocs. As Shlomo Ben-Ami
explained:
With regards to territory we do welcome the fact that we have a map from your side that
assumes the concept of annexing settlement blocks. We have the principle, but not the
necessary quantity. According to our calculations your map represents . . . essentially
2.2%. . . . It does not correspond to the parameters of President Clinton. It does not
address the major issues of stability, security, and political viability. This is why we
included the 80% requirements. I cannot have an agreement that does not incorporate
80% of the settlers-it's more or less the concept, not a math thing. It is necessary for the
stability of our borders and for the public to accept the deal .256
Thus, like the Palestinians' use of the 1967 line at Camp David, Israeli
negotiators treated percentages of territory and settlers as a construct-a
"concept" against which to evaluate Palestinian proposals. Like the
Palestinians, Israeli negotiators also cited practical and political concerns
(border security and domestic public opinion) in support of the principles they
were advocating. For legitimacy, however, the Israelis turned not to "the
international legality," as the Palestinians had, but instead to the proposals of
the President of the United States.
Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, King David Hotel, Jerusalem (Sept. 18, 2000)
(transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
Similarly, Israeli negotiator Gilad Sher acknowledged: "If I want to have control in the
[electromagnetic] sphere for my security needs, I may have to compensate you in a completely different
issue." Id.
254. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
255. Like the principles articulated by Levy, the Clinton Parameters, inter alia, provided for
Israel's annexation of settlement blocs, made no reference to the 1967 line, and proposed that Palestine
be a "non-militarized state." The sole departure from Levy's principles in the parameters was Clinton's
proposal for shared sovereignty in Jerusalem. See Clinton Parameters to Palestinian and Israeli
Negotiators (Dec. 23, 2000), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1160-
62.
256. Minutes, Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, Hilton Taba Hotel, Taba,
Egypt (Jan. 25, 2001) (transcribed by the PLO's Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO
Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
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Ultimately, the Israelis' attempt to focus discourse on the "Clinton
ideas" had little more success than the Palestinians' earlier attempt to focus it
on international law. In a reversal of roles, it was the Palestinians at talks in
January 2001 who were urging discussion of the "practicalities":
Ahmad Qurei': [W]e don't want to discuss principles and parameters[. L]et's see
the maps, the practicalities[,] and discuss.
Gilad Sher: Do you agree[,] with C[linton], that [the Palestinian allocation of
West Bank] territory is between 94% and 96%?
Qurei': We don't agree, but show us the maps and then we may be convinced.
Sher: Do you agree we need to meet re[garding] territory [on] somewhere in the
mid-90s?
Qurei': Let me see how you designed it, and then I can give a response. Let's see
257the maps. Let's see the maps,
As part of their effort to shift discourse away from the Clinton
"parameters," the Palestinians also argued-as their Israeli counterparts had
regarding international law-that the "parameters" were fatally indeterminate.
In a memorandum presenting their official response to Clinton, which was
distributed to the international diplomatic and press corps on January 1, 2001,
they expressed concern that "[t]he United States proposals were couched in
general terms that in some instances lack clarity and detail," arguing that "a
general, vague agreement at this advanced stage of the peace process will be
counter-productive. ' ' 258 They also argued that Clinton's failure to offer a
proposed map and to define the basis for the percentages of land it allocates to
each side makes it "difficult to imagine how the percentages presented can be
reconciled with the goal of Palestinian contiguity.'
259
In addition, the Palestinians raised questions about the legitimacy of the
legal framework for Clinton's proposals. In the same memorandum, they
argued that his use of "'settlement blocs' as a guiding principle" would
"subordinate[] Palestinian interests in the contiguity of their state and control
over their natural resources to Israeli interests regarding the contiguity of the
settlements, recognized as illegal by the international community.' ' 26° They
complained that Clinton's proposal on refugees "reflects a wholesale adoption
of the Israeli position that the implementation of the right of return be subject
entirely to Israel's discretion," emphasizing that "[U.N. General Assembly]
Resolution 194, long regarded as the basis for a just settlement of the refugee
problem, calls for the return of Palestinian refugees to 'their homes,' wherever
located-not to their 'homeland' or 'historic Palestine,"' as suggested by
Clinton. 26 1 And they concluded the memorandum by reiterating "that we
remain committed to a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in
257. Minutes, Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Status Negotiations, Isrotel Tower and Hotel, West
Jerusalem (Jan. 16, 2001) (transcribed by the PLO's Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO
Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
258. Official Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters (and Letter to the International
Community) (Jan. 1, 2001), in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1163-
64.
259. Id. at 1164.
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 1166.
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accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
international law."
262
Four weeks after the Palestinians' official response to the Clinton ideas
was delivered, President Clinton left office, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime
Minister of Israel, and permanent status negotiations were suspended-
permanently.
In sum, during the course of permanent status negotiations, international
legal norms were invoked in a number of different ways: as guiding principles
for the talks, as persuasive standards, as gap-fillers, and as a means of
challenging non-legal standards on the basis of which resolution of disputed
issues was urged. In the third and final Part of this Article, I undertake to
explain why international law, for the most part, failed to serve those
functions and to identify steps that may be taken to address the factors that
constrained its effectiveness during the parties' abortive peace talks.
IV. CASTING SHADOWS, PROVIDING SHADE: ROLES FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN FUTURE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS
The reasons for the failure of Palestinians and Israelis to achieve a
negotiated settlement of their dispute have been the focus of sustained debate
since the negotiations were suspended in January 2001. Although no
consensus has emerged, many factors likely contributed to the parties'
impasse, including: mutual mistrust arising not only from more than a century
of conflict, but also from the perception that obligations established by
previous agreements went unfulfilled; insufficient effort by each party to
understand and respond to the other's national narrative; perceptions of bias
on the part of American mediators; domestic political pressures and
institutional dysfunctions on both sides; and a lack of clarity and frank
discourse regarding the essential needs of each. The parties' differences
regarding the content and role of international law consequently offer only a
partial explanation for their inability to conclude an agreement. As Daniel
Bethlehem observed in a recent forum on the role of law in the Middle East
peace process:
[O]ne of the questions we must ask ourselves is whether it was the presence or absence,
or the sufficiency or insufficiency, of law that brought us either to the hopeful moments
over the past twelve years or to the moments of despair. In my view, the answer to this is
that one cannot place at the doorstep of the law either praise for the positive
developments or castigation for the negative. The law provides context to the dispute. It
is to be found to a greater or lesser extent in the engine room, either giving momentum to
262. Id. at 1167.
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initiatives towards peace or holding such initiatives back as it crystallizes the position of
the parties at the furthest extremes of the debate.
263
To be sure, the parties' legal disputes are part of a larger dynamic in
which law is only one variable. As Bethlehem goes on to suggest, moreover,
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict presents a number of issues that cannot be
resolved simply through reference to international legal rights and
obligations. 264 Law, simply put, does not provide all of the answers.
Even so, it can and should provide some of them. I submit that an
understanding of how law functions "in the engine room" offers clues about
how it might be made to function better-to provide not only "context to the
dispute," but also tools that can help to resolve it. Accordingly, in this final
Part, I examine the factors that constrained the functioning of international
legal norms in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. I then turn to offering
suggestions as to how the parties and the international community can make
international legal rules more effective in negotiations like those undertaken
by Palestinians and Israelis, both as tools of conflict resolution and as
normative standards to guide the functioning of international relations.
A. Why Didn't Law Help?
The analysis presented in Part III of this Article suggests that several
factors constrained the functioning of legal rules in Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations: disagreements about the applicability and determinacy of legal
rules; skepticism about the efficacy of solutions prescribed by legal rules; and
the perceived lack of recourse to third-party adjudication and enforcement of
legal rules. As discussed below, these factors served both to diminish
international law's shadow over the negotiations and to deter efforts to seek its
shade.
1. Disagreements about Applicability and Determinacy of Legal
Rules
Explicit discourse between the parties about the substantive contours and
implications of international law was rare during permanent status
negotiations, occurring in only a handful of instances. To the extent it did
occur, however, it provides some sense of at least the stated rationales for
Israeli negotiators' reluctance to use legal rules as guiding principles,
standards, or gap-fillers. Two kinds of legal arguments were advanced. First,
Israelis argued that the legal norms on the basis of which Palestinians urged
263. Daniel Bethlehem, Remarks, Is There a Role for International Law in the Middle East
Peace Process?, 99 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 217, 218 (2005).
264. The need to devise arrangements through which Palestinian laborers can work in Israel,
Israeli Jews can worship at holy sites in Palestinian territory (and Palestinian Christians and Muslims
can do the same in Israel), and Palestinians can travel securely and in an unimpeded manner between the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, will oblige the parties to move beyond strict application of
principles of territorial sovereignty. See id. Indeed, even advocates of a "rights-based approach" to
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict acknowledge the limitations of law. See Bisharat, supra note 8,
at 330 ("[International law] will never provide all the answers. In respect to some issues, water, the
status of Jerusalem, and perhaps others, international law may provide only the broadest parameters for
equitable resolutions. Negotiations are thus crucial, and inevitable.").
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resolution of many disputed issues were inapplicable to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. For example, they argued that the principle of the inadmissibility of
the acquisition of territory by force, affirmed in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242, was inapplicable to the West Bank and Gaza Strip because
there was no recognized border between Israel and the occupied territory prior
to 1967; and they rejected the argument that Israel's peace agreements with
Jordan and Egypt established precedents with respect to the applicability and
content of the norm because of this claimed difference in the factual
contexts. 265 They advanced similar arguments with respect to the applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, claiming that Israel was not a belligerent
occupant in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they were not recognized
266as the sovereign territory of a state prior to 1967. In the context of water
negotiations, moreover, Israelis argued against the applicability of the
principle of equitable utilization of international watercourses, asserting that
the norm had yet to achieve customary law status and consequently was not
binding upon Israel.267
Second, arguments about the applicability of international norms were
closely linked to questions about their determinacy. In water negotiations,
indeterminacy was raised explicitly: Israeli negotiators expressed
unwillingness to agree to legal principles the implications of which, they
argued, were unclear; and they took the position that international law is too
"vague" to provide a useful framework for resolution of water issues. The
disputes, in border negotiations, about the applicability of the principle of the
inadmissibility of territory by force and the Fourth Geneva Convention may
also be seen as arguments about the determinacy of these norms. Israelis were
arguing, after all, that it was unclear how these norms applied in the context of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Implicit in their argument was the idea that, if
Palestinians and Israelis each came to the table with different views about the
applicability of the norms, the norms themselves were insufficiently
determinate to guide resolution of disputed issues.
Of course, disagreement about the applicability or determinacy of legal
rules does not, in itself, render the rules inapplicable or indeterminate.
Whether offered in good faith or in bad faith, claims of inapplicability or
indeterminacy are simply claims. In the domestic setting, the validity of those
claims can be tested fairly readily, through recourse to a judicial forum. When
that recourse is available, clearly frivolous legal claims will have only limited
effect on bargaining: both parties will anticipate how they are likely to be
received by a court and devise their negotiating positions accordingly.
Because the influence of law on international bargaining is wielded through
means more diffuse and less predictable than in the domestic setting, however,
it is more difficult to trace. And, accordingly, it is more difficult to ascertain
the effect of disagreements about the law on bargaining.
At a basic level, at least, disputes between Palestinians and Israelis about
the applicability and determinacy of legal rules do seem to have constrained
265. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
266. See id.
267. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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their influence on the negotiations in a number of ways. In the absence of
efforts by authoritative members of the international community to weigh in
on the matter (an issue explored further below), the parties' disagreement
blurred the lines of the zone of lawfulness within which they were bargaining.
Thus, although international law's prohibition of acquiring territory by force
is a jus cogens norm, that norm could not operate to rule out certain deal
points, to narrow the scope of bargaining, if its applicability and interpretation
were in dispute. Moreover, to the extent that influential third parties (like
American officials) were persuaded that norms were inapplicable or
indeterminate, it made invoking the norms an ineffective means of bolstering
the credibility of a party's reservation point because uncertainty about whether
or how the norms applied made it less likely they would be imposed on the
parties in the absence of a negotiated agreement-the norms cast a minimal
shadow over bargaining.
But were they perceived nevertheless to offer shade? The record is less
clear on this point. On the one hand, allegations of inapplicability and
indeterminacy did likely diminish the persuasive force of legal rules: because
the parties could not agree on what the rules provided-or even whether they
applied in given circumstances-the rules could neither serve as standards for
resolving disputed issues (such as the allocation of sovereignty over
Jerusalem) nor as an agreed means of filling in gaps in a "thin FAPS." In this
way, claims of inapplicability and indeterminacy appear to have reduced the
"compliance pull" of legal rules-the shade they were perceived to offer.
That analysis, however, arguably oversimplifies the picture.
Notwithstanding its challenges to the applicability and determinacy of certain
rules, over time Israel's positions on some issues moved closer to the outcome
that Palestinians had argued the rules prescribed. For example, even though
Israeli officials had made clear at the outset that they would not accept "return
to the 1967 line," an EU paper on the final round of negotiations at Taba in
January 2001 reports that "[t]he two sides agreed that in accordance with U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242, the June 4[,] 1967 lines would be the basis
for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine. 268 Although the
Israeli team at Taba continued to demand significant alterations to the 1967
line to permit annexation of settlement blocs, 269 their position represented a
substantial departure from their earlier demands for annexation of much larger
swathes of West Bank land and of isolated settlements.
A number of theories may explain this shift in position: that the Israeli
team's stated opening position (or closing position) did not reflect its actual
position; that the Israelis' assessment of the strategic, economic and political
value of certain settlements changed over the course of the talks; or that other
benefits presented by a peace agreement (either with respect to specific issues
or the larger goal of ending the conflict) were perceived to outweigh the
benefits of maintaining settlements. But one cannot rule out the possibility
that legal rules influenced the decision-by virtue of the perceived
268. European Union Non-Paper on the Taba Conference, 2001, in 2 DOCUMENTS ON THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1169.
269. See id.
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reputational costs of sticking to a position at odds with them or even, simply,
by virtue of the normative force of repeated declarations by authoritative
international institutions that the rules are applicable and controlling. Indeed,
in view of the tremendous disparity in the parties' political, economic, and
military power, it is worth considering whether settlements would even have
been an item on the agenda of permanent status negotiations if the Palestinians
were not perceived to have a legal basis for challenging them. In sum,
although claims of inapplicability and indeterminacy reduced the instrumental
value of legal rules as means of bolstering the efficiency of negotiations, it is
not at all clear that they eliminated the rules' normative influence.
2. Disagreement about the Efficacy of Legal Rules
The parties' dispute about the role and relevance of international law
was not confined to disagreement about the applicability and determinacy of
legal rules; they also expressed differing views about the efficacy, as a matter
of policy, of outcomes prescribed by legal norms. Arguments of this kind
were advanced with respect to a number of issues, sometimes in tandem with
legal arguments about applicability and indeterminacy, and sometimes
independent of them.
270
The parties' negotiations over future security arrangements offer a
particularly good illustration of this kind of debate. By September 2001,
Israeli negotiators had acknowledged that a Palestinian state would be
established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that it would have sovereign
powers in many spheres. 27 1 They sought, however, to obtain the Palestinians'
272agreement to a number of significant derogations from their sovereignty.
The Israeli team was not, by this stage, challenging the Palestinians'
entitlement to territorial sovereignty; instead, they were arguing that
structuring the agreement solely around sovereign rights would produce an
undesirable outcome. Their position, they explained, was animated in part by
practical considerations (such as the difficulty of dividing control over civil
aviation in view of the size and idiosyncratic contours of the two states'
territories). 273 It was also motivated, they said, by two elements of Israel's
"national security concept": skepticism about the capacity of a peace
agreement with the Palestinians to eliminate security threats from elsewhere in
270. Israelis argued, for example, that the dismantlement of settlements was "unrealistic." See
supra note 186 and accompanying text. They also argued against using sovereignty as a guiding
principle for determining allocations of water because to do so, they claimed, would harm both parties.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text. And while declining to concede Palestinian refugees' legal
right of return, their arguments against it were framed primarily in terms of practical considerations-in
particular, the possibility that its realization would eliminate the Jewish majority within the State of
Israel.
271. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
272. See Minutes, Permanent Status Negotiations, King David Hotel, Jerusalem (Sept. 17,
2000) (transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
These derogations included demilitarization of the Palestinian state, the maintenance of Israeli military
bases and early warning stations in Palestinian territory, the right to use Palestinian airspace for military
training and operations, and the right to deploy Israeli forces in Palestinian territory during emergency
situations. Id.
273. See Minutes, Permanent Status Negotiations, Hilton Taba Hotel, Taba (Jan. 23, 2001)
(transcribed by PLO Negotiations Support Unit) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
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the region and an unwillingness to compromise Israel's independent defensive
capacity-to place Israel's security in the hands of others.274
Policy concerns of this kind made it difficult for the parties to agree that
a set of norms, such as those defining the sovereign rights of states, would
serve as guiding principles for the talks. They also limited the persuasive force
of the legal rules invoked by the Palestinians, the Israelis questioning the
extent to which the rules were responsive to the geo-political context in which
the parties were negotiating. What was in dispute in this context, however,
was not the content of the norms, but the value of the ideas they embodied. By
challenging the efficacy of the norms, the Israelis were asserting that
international law offers little shade.
3. Lack of Recourse to Third-Party Adjudication and
Enforcement
As described in Part III, a broad cross-section of the international
community undertook on a number of occasions to define a substantive
framework for the resolution of permanent status issues, often through
reference to international legal norms. From the beginning of the peace
process, however, the United States declined to participate in such efforts,
insisting that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be solved only through
bilateral negotiations and refusing to support (or, indeed, permit) "a
competing or parallel process" in the United Nations. 275 Once permanent
status negotiations commenced, moreover, American officials expressed
impatience with appeals by the Palestinians to weigh in on legal disputes.
When President Clinton did eventually offer a set of "ideas" for resolution of
key issues in December 2000, he referred to the parties' legal terms of
reference only briefly-and in instrumental rather than prescriptive terms.
276
To be sure, American officials were not entirely unwilling to wield the
United States's influence, even beyond the articulation of "ideas" for
resolution of the conflict. As Dennis Ross argues in the concluding chapter of
his memoir:
Almost by definition, the best measure of whether the parties are ready to conclude the
conflict is whether they are prepared to make historic decisions. . . . We can offer
guarantees on security; financial assistance to demonstrate the material benefits of hard
decisions; and political and international support to bolster the legitimacy of the
decisions, all of which may be important in helping each side cross historic thresholds.
274. See Minutes, Permanent Status Negotiations, King David Hotel, Jerusalem (Sept. 18,
2000) (on file with PLO Negotiations Affairs Dep't).
275. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
276. Clinton suggests that the parties "agree" that his proposed resolution of the refugee issue
"implements [UN General Assembly] Resolution 194" and proposes that, upon conclusion of an
agreement, the Security Council pass a resolution noting "that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been
implemented." Clinton Parameters to Palestinian and Israeli Negotiators (Dec. 23, 2000), in 2
DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1160, 1162. This approach to addressing
Resolution 242 was suggested by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David to "allow Barak to hold to his
earlier claim that a settlement would fulfill 242, even if it was not based on 242." SWISHER, supra note
6, at 269.
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But we cannot create the will for such decisions. . . . Imposed decisions will not
endure.
277
As he describes it, Ross's vision is one of carrots rather than sticks, of offering
incentives rather than imposing costs. It is a vision in which the enforcement
of legal rules has no place. Indeed, Ross sees third-party intervention as a
means of allowing leaders to escape responsibility for political decisions:
"[T]he United States may make its greatest contribution to peace by standing
against efforts to impose solutions and standing for the principle that regional
leaders must finally exercise their responsibilities to confront history and
mythology." 278 The American role, from Ross's perspective, is to facilitate
negotiations, not to constrain their outcome.
Whether the United States actually played this role during Palestinian-
Israeli peace talks is, of course, open to question. American officials, after all,
did not limit themselves to providing a forum for the talks or to transmitting
messages between the parties. On a number of occasions, they offered their
own assessment of the reasonableness of the parties' positions, sometimes
even characterizing Israeli proposals as American ideas.279 Aaron Miller, who
served with Ross on the American peace team, suggests that Israel more often
than not was the beneficiary of American interventions:
With the best of motives and intentions, we listened to and followed Israel's lead without
critically examining what that would mean for our own interests, for those on the Arab
side and for the overall success of the negotiations. The "no surprises" policy, under
which we had to run everything by Israel first, stripped our policy of the independence
and flexibility required for serious peacemaking. If we couldn't put proposals on the table
without checking with the Israelis first, and refused to push back when they said no, how
effective could our mediation be? Far too often, particularly when it came to Israeli-
Palestinian diplomacy, our departure point was not what was needed to reach an
agreement acceptable to both sides but what would pass with only one-Israel.
28
0
On the other hand, American officials did not hesitate to "push back" when it
came to the Palestinians. Near the conclusion of the Camp David summit, for
example, President Clinton warned Chairman Arafat that a failure to offer
further concessions would be costly: "You won't have a state, and relations
between America and the Palestinians will be over. Congress will vote to stop
the aid you've been allocated, and you'll be treated as a terrorist
organization.28
Although Israeli negotiators had responded dismissively to Palestinian
legal arguments in the first rounds of negotiations, stating explicitly that "no
one can force Israel to adopt another interpretation" of disputed norms,282 the
American response to them challenged the Palestinian approach in a more
fundamental way. The United States, after all, was not simply a mediator. Its
tremendous international influence and its Security Council veto rendered it
capable of blocking almost any effort to impose terms (or some form of
277. Ross, supra note 6, at 772.
278. Id.
279. See SWISHER, supra note 6, at 297.
280. Aaron David Miller, Israel's Lawyer, WASH. POST, May 23, 2005, at A19.
281. ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 253.
282. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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censure) on the parties if they failed to reach agreement, as it had
demonstrated repeatedly during the decade leading up to the Camp David
summit.283 Indeed, in a unipolar world, the shadow of the law is shaped by-if
not coextensive with-the shadow of American power. 284 Accordingly, the
unwillingness of the Clinton team to entertain Palestinian legal claims at
Camp David, and the indication it provided of the attitude the United States
was likely to assume if the parties failed to reach agreement, seriously eroded
the credibility of the Palestinians' invocation of "international legality"; it
shortened the shadow of the legal norms on which the Palestinians were
basing their positions. It is consequently unsurprising that, following President
Clinton's angry rebuke of Palestinian negotiators at Camp David, the
Palestinians turned increasingly to citing legal norms as persuasive standards
in negotiations rather than demanding agreement on them as a pre-condition
for further talks. It is also unsurprising that the Palestinians increasingly based
their arguments on non-legal grounds, both political and practical.
Of course, the United States is not-and was not then-the only actor on
the international stage. On a number of occasions, Palestinians sought the
involvement of others, particularly Arab and Muslim states and the European
285Union. In this regard, it is not incidental that the Palestinians' January 1,
2001 memorandum explaining their concerns about the Clinton "ideas" was
circulated widely to international diplomatic personnel rather than only to the
Americans. But the Palestinians recognized that no other international actor
had influence over Israel's actions comparable to that of the United States and
that, consequently, apeals to others were unlikely to cast much of a shadow
over the peace talks.
B. How Can Law Help in the Future?
Future efforts to achieve a negotiated peace between Palestinians and
Israelis must be informed by an appreciation of both the opportunities offered
by law and the factors that constrained its effectiveness in the past. As
described in Part II of this Article, law has the potential to facilitate bargaining
in a number of different ways. It can operate to shape negotiating parties'
bargaining zone, both disallowing certain outcomes and defining defaults that
help each side to identify its own reservation point and assess the credibility
of its adversary's. It can serve to fill in gaps in an agreement, obviating the
283. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
284. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
873 (2003) (describing United States's "hegemonic" influence over development and enforcement of
international law within U.N. Security Council).
285. See ENDERLIN, supra note 6, at 180; SWISHER, supra note 6, at 175-76.
286. See Miller, supra note 280, at A19 ("I believe in the importance of a strong U.S.-lsraeli
relationship. Paradoxically, it is our intimacy with the Israelis that gives America--only America-the
capacity to be an honest and effective broker. Arab governments have come to accept this reality. That is
why-even now-when our credibility is so diminished in the region, they continue to press for U.S.
engagement."); see also INT'L CRISIS GROUP, MIDDLE EAST ENDGAME I: GETTtNG TO A COMPREHENSIVE
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT 9 (2002) (observing that "unique relationship between Washington
and Jerusalem" and "America's unmatched ability to provide logistical backing to a peace deal" make
American involvement in Middle East peacemaking essential); SWISHER, supra note 6, at 147-48 (noting
Palestinian perception that pleas to the U.N. General Assembly were unlikely to affect course of
negotiations if American support was wanting).
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need to negotiate, in detail, every aspect of the parties' future relations. As an
expression of best practices or by virtue of its objectiveness, it can provide a
standard with which to evaluate the efficacy or fairness of a particular
proposal. And it can provide legitimacy, a means of validating proposals (and
negotiated outcomes) in the eyes of domestic constituencies and other
international actors whose support is critical to the success of an agreement.
Each of these functions might have served Palestinian and Israeli
negotiators well during the peace talks. Greater clarity from the outset
regarding the legal framework for the talks might have helped to prevent the
extreme divergence between the parties' respective opening positions-a
divergence that not only generated misgivings on each side about the other's
intentions, but also made it difficult for the parties to assess what kind of deal
was possible, greatly slowing the pace of negotiations. In addition, in a
process constrained politically by the short deadlines defined by the parties,
consensus about guiding legal principles might have enabled the parties to
make constructive use of legal norrns as gap-fillers and as a means of framing
tradeoffs. To cite one example, a shared acknowledgement of the applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza Strip-and of
the fact (recognized by the Security Council 287 and the International Court of
Justice 288) that Israel's settlements in occupied territory contravene Article 49
of the Convention-would not have foreclosed a range of negotiated solutions
to the issue of settlements, including some combination of annexation by
Israel, dismantlement, long-term leasing, desegregation, and territory
exchange. It would, however, have framed the trade-offs that a territorial
compromise would require and offered both a standard for prioritizing
competing Israeli and Palestinian claims to contiguity in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem and a default with which to fill in gaps (and resolve
ambiguities) in proposals like those presented by President Clinton in
December 2000. Moreover, clearer alignment between the Clinton "ideas" and
recognized international norms may well have bolstered their legitimacy in the
eyes of Palestinians and of other governments called upon to convince
Chairman Arafat to accept them.
Of course, arguing that law might have helped the parties in the past
simply begs a larger question: How can law be made a more effective tool in
the future? In order for legal rules to function better when Palestinians and
Israelis try again to resolve their dispute at the negotiating table, efforts must
be undertaken to address the factors that constrained their capacity to bolster
the efficiency and fairness of the parties' last attempt to negotiate a peace
agreement. Potential responses to those factors are described briefly below.
287. See S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. SIRES/465 (March I, 1980).
288. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 134, at 54 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/docket/imwp/imwpframe.htm [hereinafter I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Construction of a
Wall].
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1. Clarifying Rules
The parties' disagreements about the applicability and determinacy of
legal rules, as they bear on the issues in dispute, oblige a response on several
levels. At a basic level, there continues to be a need for further development
of international legal rules to ensure that they are responsive to recent
transformations in the international system, including evolving conceptions of
state sovereignty, global security, and the relationship of both to individual
rights. 289 That process, however, is likely to be slow; and the need for
flexibility in international rules-both to garner support for them from ever-
reluctant governments and to ensure that the rules have the capacity to
accommodate equitable concerns-will limit the determinacy of even those
rules that are embraced by the international community.
What is more critical-and more feasible-at this juncture is a concerted
effort by states and international institutions to articulate a common
understanding regarding the applicability and implications of existing norms
in the Palestinian-Israeli context. Such an effort could serve to increase the
compliance-pull of the relevant norms-the shade they offer-by rendering
them more determinate and bolstering their perceived legitimacy. It could also
serve to facilitate the imposition of costs on the parties for failure to comply
with the norms, extending the norms' shadow over future bargaining.
The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory goes some of this distance, establishing, inter alia, that "the [Fourth
Geneva] Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories,' 290 and that
"the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East
Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law."291 (Both of
these conclusions received the unanimous support of the Court.) 292 Although
the World Court does not offer any judgments regarding the bearing of the
Fourth Geneva Convention on the disposition of settlements, confining itself
to encouraging peace efforts "with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on
the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding
problems, ' 293 its opinion does resolve at least one of the normative disputes
that divided Palestinians and Israelis during permanent status negotiations.
The World Court's advisory opinion and other efforts by international
institutions to clarify normative standards are unlikely to have a direct
influence 294 on future negotiations, however, unless authoritative members of
289. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our
shared responsibility, 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004) (declaring that sovereignty "carries
with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the
wider international community"). Such efforts may help to address challenges to the efficacy of
international legal rules like those raised in the security talks described above. See supra notes 273-274
and accompanying text.
290. L C.J. Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall, para. 101, 2004 I.C.J. at 40.
291. Id. para. 120, at 46-47.
292. Id. paras. 2 & 9, at I & 4 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
293. Id. para. 162, at 62.
294. The litigation before the World Court arguably has already had an indirect influence on
Israel's legal posture. See Yossi ALPHER, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE: SPECIAL REPORT No. 149, THE FuTURE
OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT. CRITICAL TRENDS AFFECTING ISRAEL, 9 (Sept. 2005), available at
Shadow or Shade
the international community both embrace their conclusions and take the
additional step of reaching consensus regarding their basic implications vis-A-
vis permanent status issues. In this regard, a number of commentators have
suggested that the parties' impasse will only be overcome if the international
community, led by the United States, articulates clearer parameters to guide
future negotiations. For example, in a recent article, Russell Korobkin and
Jonathan Zasloff argue that the United States should present the parties "with
a detailed set of agreement terms that it considers fair and reasonable to both
sides," 295a conclusion also reached by the International Crisis Group
("ICG"). 29' Korobkin and Zasloff take no position, however, regarding the
content of these terms or their relation to international legal norms; indeed,
"[f]rom the perspective of [their] theoretical approach, the substance of the
terms proposed is irrelevant. What matters is only that the set of terms falls
inside the bargaining zone ... so that both parties will prefer agreement on the
terms included in the initiative to the impossibility of reaching any
agreement." 297 Although the ICG does offer suggestions regarding the
substantive content of the proposed parameters, it also is silent with respect to
298their relationship to international legal norms.
What these proposals underestimate, however, is the importance of
making clear that proposed parameters are in alignment with established
international norms. As described in Part III, the influence of the Clinton
"ideas" during the last weeks of permanent status negotiations was
undermined by the Palestinians' perception that the ideas were the product of
pro-Israel bias on the part of the American team and represented a departure
from their recognized rights-perceptions that arguably reinforced each other.
An effort to demonstrate the consistency of new parameters for the
negotiations with international norms is likely to bolster their persuasiveness
not only among Palestinians (and perhaps also Israelis), but also among other
members of the international community, whose support for the parameters
would provide a critical indication of their legitimacy.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr/49.pdf (suggesting that Israel High Court of Justice opinion
in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov't of Israel was decided "partly in anticipation of the ICJ ruling").
The Court's decision is also likely to shape future Israeli court decisions, which could, in turn, affect
Israel's position in future negotiations with the Palestinians. Moshe Hirsch, The Impact of the Advisory
Opinion on Israel's Future Policy: International Relations Perspective, I J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 319,
334-35 (2005).
295. Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 7, at 46.
296. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 286, at 12.
297. Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 7, at 47-48.
298. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 286, at 14-17.
299. The inattention of Korobkin and Zasloff and the ICG to the value of linking proposed
parameters to established international norms is surprising in view of the emphasis placed by both on the
importance of obtaining broad international support for the parameters. See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra
note 7, at 46-47 ("The support of the international community for the U.S. proposal, perhaps in the form
of a U.N. Security Council resolution, would have important benefits," including "underrnin[ing] likely
claims that the United States is biased in favor of Israel"; diminishing the credibility of the "Palestinian
claim that an unlimited right of return for refugees is required by international law"; bolstering the
credibility of the United States refusal to accept further negotiation of the proposal's terms; and
"providing political cover to the Arab states and allowing them to support the proposal without
appearing to have succumbed to U.S. pressure."); INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 286, at 10 (calling for
international backing of parameters).
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To be sure, not all of the parties' disputes regarding the determinacy of
international legal rules can be resolved by the international community. As
Abram Chayes observes:
International law, in its normative sense, must be seen as indeterminate with respect to
much of the array of concrete choices open in a particular situation. Often the rules have
no authoritative formulation in words. Even when they do, the terms are open to a broad
range of interpretation and emphasis. They do not dictate conduct so much as orient
deliberation, order priorities, guide within broad limits.3°
But even if the most that international law can do with respect to some
issues is to "orient deliberation, order priorities, [and] guide within broad
limits," that is no small contribution in the highly politicized context of
peacemaking-particularly when even the broad limits are in dispute.
Indeterminacy, moreover, need not foreclose legal discourse. Indeed, the
flexibility created by a certain degree of indeterminacy may serve to facilitate
discourse about fairness: As Thomas Franck suggests, "the legitimacy costs of
introducing less determinate elements of distributive justice into the text of a
rule . . . are more than balanced by the gains achieved when that law's
standard opens a more generous fairness discourse."' 301 Thus, while the
incorporation of equitable standards into legal rules (such as those discussed
by the parties during their water negotiations) 3° 2 may serve to make the rules
less useful in defining predictable outcomes, it also increases their perceived
fairness-and, consequently, the willingness of parties to resolve disputes
within the framework of law. Put another way, while equity shortens the
shadow of the law, it may make the shade it does offer more attractive.
2. Focusing on Persuasion
The perceived inefficacy of solutions prescribed by international legal
norms is in some ways a more difficult challenge to overcome. To a certain
extent, it can be addressed through persuasive discourse-by moving beyond
simply reciting norms to explaining how the other party's equitable concerns
can be addressed within the framework of law. As the Israelis made clear
during negotiations over water issues, a party will hesitate to embrace a norm
as a guiding principle for talks without some idea of its implications and
without confidence that the proposed legal framework is responsive to the
party's needs. Although it may seem to be putting the cart before the horse, a
detailed explanation of the practical consequences of accepting particular
legal rules as standards for the resolution of disputed issues may be necessary
to persuade the other party to embrace them. In an international system that
continues to be built on consent, adversarial legal arguments devised for the
courtroom are unlikely to be effective in the negotiating room, even if they are
emotionally satisfying.
Discourse about the responsiveness of legal norms to equitable concerns
should not, moreover, be confined to the negotiating room. As Harold Koh
300. CHAYES, supra note 60, at 101-02.
301. FAIRNESS, supra note 68, at 33.
302. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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has argued, governments' internalization of international norms is often the
product of interaction at the transnational level-among a range of
governmental and non-govemmental actors-rather than solely at the
intergovernmental level.3  This is not simply a matter of public relations,
though outreach of that kind is important; it is also a matter of making the
case in the myriad of forums where government officials, judges, academics,
and technical experts interact. While the general public in Israel, Palestine,
and elsewhere may have little appetite for a disquisition on the finer points of
the United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, for example, second-track negotiations, academic conferences,
and meetings of (and with) international institutions provide rich opportunities
for exploring how the concerns and interests of both parties can be addressed
within bodies of law. The fact that the influence of these forums on
governmental decisions is difficult to anticipate and measure does not make
its influence less real.
As the parties' disagreements in security talks make clear, however, it is
particularly challenging to overcome skepticism about the efficacy of
international law-based solutions when it is animated by skepticism about the
international system itself. Convincing a nation still haunted by the Holocaust
to abandon a security concept built upon independent defensive capacity in
favor of a model based on cooperation, sovereign rights, and international
guarantees is not an easy task in the best of circumstances. When it is
undertaken only a few years after the international community again failed-
twice-to prevent genocide, it becomes even more difficult. To acknowledge
this difficulty is not to suggest that Israel's current security concept is either
effective or sustainable, or that the Palestinians and others should cease to
urge a different approach. The credibility of such persuasive efforts, however,
is inextricably linked to the perceived strengths and frailties of international
institutions and processes. The international community's failure to prevent
and respond effectively to international crises will have implications far
beyond the specific crisis in question, and attempts to promote compliance
with international law by restricting access to or participation in international
institutions will have little effect if the institutions themselves are not
perceived to offer real benefits. Simply put, a naked tree will not be seen to
offer much shade.
3. Exerting Third-Party Influence
It is difficult to conceive of the circumstances that would prompt the
international community to intervene militarily to end the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, even if such intervention were likely to be effective. Despite the lack
of recourse to police action, however, third parties are not without means to
influence the negotiating positions and preferences of Palestinians and
Israelis. As noted above, they have an important role to play in helping to
clarify the content and implications of international law. In this regard, third
party governments should explicitly link both peace proposals (like the
303. Koh, supra note 3, at 2648-49.
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Clinton "ideas" or the "Roadmap") and expressions of censure (such as the
condemnation of settlement construction or the refusal of many states to deal
with the Palestinian Authority's Hamas-led government) to relevant
international norms. Conversely, discourse in intergovernmental forums like
the United Nations should move beyond rote citation of norms to a broader
discourse about what law does not address-and the opportunities that silence
offers for addressing equitable concerns (like the factors supporting border
modifications) within a legal framework. Third parties also can contribute
much by building the capacity of international institutions to provide forums
and tools for resolving disputed issues. Indeed, because so many of the issues
on the table in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations demand cooperative solutions
requiring substantial technical expertise-such as the management of cross-
border trade and movement of persons, control over and allocation of
electromagnetic frequencies, the management of the two countries' airspace
and of infrastructure in shared spaces such as Jerusalem, and even ongoing
responses to low-level security threats-international and regional
organizations have much to offer the parties as vehicles both for the exchange
of information about best practices and for involving other interested parties
in solving specific problems.3 4
These kinds of efforts can increase the compliance pull of legal
rules3 05-the shade of the law-which, in turn, may bolster their effectiveness
as persuasive standards and gap-fillers. In addition, third parties can extend
the shadow of international law by taking steps that impose costs on the
parties for non-compliance. As others have observed, such steps may include
withholding or constraining trade privileges, 306 suspending economic
assistance, 307 facilitating criminal prosecution in domestic and international
forums of officials accused of war crimes and related offenses, 308 and
economic sanctions.
309
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the merits or feasibility of
these kinds of measures, but two points bear emphasizing. First, although it is
undoubtedly advantageous to all concerned to allow Palestinians and Israelis
304. These organizations may include international bodies such as the International
Telecommunications Union (which has expertise in addressing electromagnetic sphere issues), the
International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Trade Organization, as well as regional bodies
such as NATO and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. See generally Robert 0.
Keohane, The demand for international regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 170 (Stephen
Krasner ed., 1983) (describing how international regimes facilitate substantive agreements between
states).
305. See generally Hirsch, supra note 294, at 332-43 (assessing, from liberal and constructivist
viewpoints, the likely impact of the I.C.J. advisory opinion on Israeli policy).
306. See Quigley, supra note 8, at 378-79 (describing, with approval, efforts to enforce human
rights provisions within agreements between the European Union and Israel).
307. See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 7, at 60-61 (suggesting economic assistance to Israelis
and Palestinians be made contingent on acceptance of U.S.-proposed parameters).
308. See MP's call for sanctions against Israel for shootings, TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Apr. 4,
2006), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/04/l l/usanctions.xml
(last visited Apr. 22, 2006).
309. See John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Palestinian-Israeli Peace
Process, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rev. 73, 88 (2002) (suggesting sanctions as one potential means of
encouraging Israel to adhere to international-law based solutions); Carlos Ortiz, Note, Does a Double
Standard Exist at the United Nations?: A Focus on Iraq, Israel and the Influence of the United States on
the UN, 22 WISC. INT'L L.J. 393, 395-96 (2004) (same).
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maximum flexibility to structure their future relationship according to terms
that they deem mutually beneficial and sustainable, the international
community has a responsibility to ensure that their agreement falls within the
broad limits defined by mandatory rules of international law-the zone of
lawfulness. The functions served by mandatory rules in domestic settings-
compensating for distortions in the bargaining process resulting from gross
inequality between the parties and ensuring that a negotiated agreement does
not violate important public policies or the rights of those unrepresented at the
negotiating table-are no less important at the international level. Indeed, they
are of particular relevance when the negotiating process takes place in the
context of military occupation. 310 When the norms in question are central to
the proper functioning of the international system, moreover, the entire
international community has a stake in compliance with them, if only because
non-compliance creates a precedent that may encourage illegal behavior by
others and may compromise the legitimacy of international efforts in other
contexts to respond to it.
Second, clarification by the international community of the content and
implications of legal rules and of the costs of failing to reach an agreement in
accordance with them may bolster not only the fairness of a negotiated
outcome, but also the efficiency of the negotiation process. In addition to
narrowing the scope of bargaining, framing trade-offs, and providing defaults
with which to fill in gaps, such clarification may help to reduce the domestic
political costs to the parties' respective leaderships of making a deal, as
illustrated by the Gulf of Maine litigation. Ultimately, the compromises
necessary to bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to an end will, as Dennis
Ross observes, require the leadership of both sides to "exercise their
responsibilities to confront history and mythology,"'311 an effort that inevitably
will invite opposition within both communities even if majorities on both
sides favor compromise. To require Palestinian and Israeli leaders to bear that
responsibility alone in the fragile, fragmented political context in which both
operate is to make peace contingent upon visionary, self-sacrificing political
leadership that is as rare in Palestine and Israel as it is in the rest of the world.
V. CONCLUSION
Palestinian poet Muhammad al-As'ad asks, "With what faith can . . .
naked trees cast shade?" 312 In an international legal order that remains
"inchoate, unformed and only just discernible," 3 and in which the
enforcement of legal norms is rare, the value of international law in
peacemaking is to some extent a question of faith-faith in the power of ideas,
in the effectiveness of institutions, and in the commitments of others. In the
310. Humanitarian law acknowledges the potential for coercion inherent in negotiations
between an occupying power and "the authorities of the occupied territories." Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; see also Quigley, supra note 8, at 377-78; Imseis, supra note 7, at 126-27.
311. Ross, supra note 6, at 772.
312. a-As'ad, supra note 1, at 123.
313. SINCLAIR, supra note 47, at 223.
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continuing struggle over the fate of the Holy Land, however, these kinds of
faith have failed to command enough believers.
As I have undertaken to demonstrate in this Article, the capacity of law
to facilitate and guide negotiations rests on the perception by bargaining
parties that legal rules either cast a shadow or offer shade. Norms whose
enforcement appears remote or whose fairness or capacity to deliver benefits
is in question will exert minimal influence over bargaining. Indeed, in the
context of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, international law too often was
perceived as a naked tree. The reluctance of the United States to constrain the
substantive direction of the peace talks or to permit censure of Israel for non-
compliance with international law substantially shortened the perceived
shadow of the law. At the same time, the shade of the law-its "compliance
pull" independent of the prospect of enforcement-was diminished by a
number of factors: the tendency of Palestinian negotiators, particularly early
in the negotiations, to cite legal norms as dictates that require strict adherence,
without undertaking to persuade Israeli negotiators about the responsiveness
of the legal framework they invoked to Israeli equitable concerns; disputes
between the parties about the applicability and determinacy of relevant norms;
and a prevailing skepticism among Israeli political and military elites about
the capacity of international law and institutions to offer benefits and security
to Israel, in view of their impotence in addressing many of the crises of the
twentieth century.
What I hope this Article also demonstrates, however, is that international
law need not be a naked tree. Efforts by the international community to clarify
the content and implications of international legal rules, at least as they apply
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict-and to impose costs on the parties for non-
compliance-can do much to extend law's influence. In addition, such efforts
should be complemented by persuasive discourse regarding the fairness and
efficacy of resolving disputed issues within a legal framework: Although the
recognition of legal rights should inform the framework for negotiations, it
neither obviates the need to explain the legitimacy and justness of the rights
invoked nor should it foreclose discussion of equitable interests that may
justify a departure from the remedy prescribed by law. This kind of persuasive
effort, moreover, should not be confined to discussions between legal counsel
across the negotiating table, and it need not await the formal resumption of
negotiations. Indeed, if international law is to embody the international
community's values and ideals-if it is to provide shade from the glare of
political conflict-then broad-based discourse about its content, its demands,
and its limitations should be an integral component of efforts to build popular
support for peace.
